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Winchester: A Tax Theory of the Firm

A TAX THEORY OF THE FIRM
Richard Winchester*

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States taxes business profits in two fundamentally different
ways, depending on how the firm is classified by the tax system.1 In some
cases, the rules treat the firm as an extension of its owners and impose no
obligation on the firm to pay tax on its profits.2 Instead, the firm’s owners
have to pay tax on their share of those profits, whether they receive a
distribution from the firm or not.3 This describes the partnership model
for taxing business profits and it is the default rule that applies to
partnerships and other unincorporated business firms, including limited
liability companies.4 Sole proprietorships are taxed in a similar fashion.5
Under the second approach for taxing business profits, the firm and its
owners are treated as separate and distinct taxpaying units. Accordingly,
the firm has an independent obligation to pay tax on any profits it derives,
regardless if it retains those earnings or distributes them to its owners.6
Additionally, the owners have a separate obligation to pay tax on any
profits they actually receive from the firm.7 Thus, any earnings paid to
the firm’s owners are subject to tax at both the firm level and the owner
level.8 This two-tiered system describes the corporate model for taxing
* Visiting Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Princeton
University. I wish to thank Tracy Kaye, Ajay Mehrotra, Roberta Mann, and Stephen Lubben for their
thoughtful feedback and comments on earlier versions of this Article. However, I take full responsibility
for any errors.
1. These two different approaches have existed in one form or another ever since Congress
adopted an income tax after it gained full Constitutional power to enact such a tax without having to
allocate the tax burden among the states based on population. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
2. E.g., I.R.C. § 701.
3. Id.
4. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(i). The Internal Revenue Code contains several variations of
the partnership model of taxation. See Willard Taylor, Can We Clean This Up? A Brief Journey Through
the United States Rules for Taxing Business Entities, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 323 (2016). The vast majority of
those rules apply to specialized industries and situations. However, the rules of subchapter S give many
incorporated firms the option to have their profits taxed under a partnership model of taxation. See I.R.C.
§§ 1361-1379.
5. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(2) and 162(a).
6. I.R.C. § 11.
7. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7).
8. This is why many refer to this scheme as one that imposes a “double tax” on dividends. E.g.,
Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C.L. REV.
613 (1990); Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 239 (2003); Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95
VA. L. REV. 517 (2009). The implication is that dividends are taxed at twice the rate that would ordinarily
apply. However, that is misleading because the tax is not necessarily twice what it would be.
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business profits. It is the default method that now applies to any business
that is organized as a corporation under state law.9
Many scholars have questioned the merits of having two vastly
different approaches for taxing business profits.10 However, Congress is
unlikely to adopt a uniform method for taxing business profits anytime
soon. That makes it imperative to have a rational way to determine when
one approach should yield to the other. That requires one to examine the
tax law’s entity classification rules, because a firm’s tax classification
dictates how its profits are taxed.
For decades, the tax rules for classifying business firms focused on
legal and formalistic factors. This practice can be traced back to the
formative years of the modern income tax when the corporate tax applied
to any firm that was incorporated under state law.11 However, under
regulations issued by the Treasury Department, any unincorporated firm
could also be subject to the tax if it possessed certain distinctively
corporate characteristics.12 Over time, the government made certain
modifications to the rules, which became known as the resemblance test.
The focus, however, has always been whether the firm possessed the
legalistic and formalistic characteristics that are distinctively corporate.13
By 1960, the regulations were refined to include the following list of six
9. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1). These rules also control the taxation of firms organized as
joint stock companies and associations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)-(7). The same rules also apply
to any partnership that qualifies as a publicly traded partnership. See I.R.C. § 7701(a).
10. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through CorporateShareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995) (proposing to integrate the corporateshareholder income tax); Daniel Halperin, Fundamental Tax Reform, 48 EMORY L.J. 809 (1999)
(proposing a combination of changes, including full indexation and corporate integration); and Anthony
P. Polito, Note, A Proposal for an Integrated Income Tax, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1009 (1989)
(arguing that integration would advance horizontal and vertical equity). However, there have been several
arguments advanced defending the policy of applying the corporate tax to incorporated firms. See Heather
M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box”, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 509-15 (2009) (summarizing the
arguments, critiquing them, and citing sources).
11. It was not entirely clear whether the initial legislation creating the modern income tax actually
imposed the corporate tax on business entities other than state law corporations and joint-stock companies.
See Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437,
459-466 (1995) (discussing the ambiguities imbedded in the Revenue Acts of 1913 and 1916). However,
by 1918, it was clear that an unincorporated business entity could indeed be subject to the corporate tax.
Id. at 467.
12. See Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1502, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591 (1921). Thus, a trust
would be treated as equivalent to a corporation if it engaged in an active business and if the beneficiaries
had control over the manner in which the trustees conducted the business. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1504, 23
Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591. Meanwhile, a partnership could be subject to the corporate tax if the firm’s
interests were freely transferable and some of its members were passive investors. Treas. Reg. 45, art.
1503, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591. A third rule treated a limited partnership as a corporation for tax
purposes if it provided for limited liability, freely transferable interests and the right to bring suit in a
common name. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1506, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 592.
13. See Hobbs, supra note 11, at 437 (recounting in rich detail the evolution of the rules for
classifying firms as corporations for tax purposes).
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corporate characteristics: (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on
business activity and to distribute the resulting profits, (3) continuity of
life, (4) centralized management, (5) limited liability, and (6) free
transferability of interests.14
Even though the government has consistently used such factors to
determine whether an unincorporated firm resembles a corporation, it has
not taken a consistent approach in the way it evaluates and weighs those
factors. Instead, the government has recalibrated the test in response to
taxpayer efforts to qualify for a tax classification that yields a particular
tax outcome. Thus, in the early years, when corporate dividends were
taxed more heavily than other business profits, taxpayers structured their
business ventures in ways that would prevent a business entity from
qualifying as a corporation. The Treasury’s response was to make the
rules apply in a way that was biased in favor of treating such an
unincorporated firm as a corporation.15 Later, when it became more tax
advantageous to be treated as a corporation, Treasury recalibrated the
rules so that it was more difficult for an unincorporated firm to qualify as
one.16 It was apparent that the factors listed in the regulations could be
manipulated by taxpayers to achieve a certain tax result without adversely
affecting the desired economic outcome.17 This exposed the inherent
defect in the government’s entity classification rules: the factors used to
classify business entities were entirely formalistic and legalistic; they had
no bearing on the economic realities that truly mattered to taxpayers.
After decades of less than satisfactory results with its approach for
classifying business entities, the Internal Revenue Service abandoned the
emphasis on legal formalities. Today, a firm can explicitly opt out of the
default tax rules that would ordinarily apply to it in the vast majority of
cases. Thus, a partnership can choose to be classified as a corporation so
that its profits are first taxed to the firm and later taxed to the owners in
the event the firm actually distributes its profits to them.18 Similarly,
many corporations can choose to have their profits taxed under a modified
version of the partnership model, so that the shareholders are taxed on
their shares of the firm’s profits while the firm itself pays no tax.19
Understandably, taxpayers welcome the flexibility to choose the rules

14. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (1960), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409.
15. Hobbs, supra note 11, at 477 (discussing the regulations issued under the 1934 Revenue Act).
16. Id. at 486; Field, supra note 10, at 460 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960)).
17. This was particularly true if the firm was organized as a limited liability company under state
law. The Internal Revenue Service acknowledged as much. See I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). A separate statutory provision permits a
partnership to elect not to be subject to the rules that would ordinarily apply to the firm. I.R.C. § 761(a).
However, that rule does not technically reclassify the partnership as a corporation for tax purposes.
19. See I.R.C. §§ 1363, 1366.
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that apply to them.20 After all, this allows them to control two key things:
(1) the amount of tax owed on the firm’s profits, and (2) the timing of the
tax liability. However, this freedom to choose has been criticized on
equitable and other grounds.21 Importantly, giving individual taxpayers
the power to choose what to pay and when to pay it does not represent
sound tax policy, especially in a tax system that purports to operate on the
basis of an individual’s ability to pay.22 For example, when individuals
can choose the rules that apply to them, taxpayers with the same capacity
to pay may end up paying different tax amounts solely because one
taxpayer can disguise her ability to pay, violating the principle of
horizontal equity. That, in turn, makes it harder for the tax system to
fulfill a related principle known as vertical equity, which generally
requires individuals with greater ability to pay to actually pay more than
individuals who have a lower ability to pay. If some taxpayers can
artificially lower their tax bill despite their ability to pay, then individuals
with the greatest capacity to pay will not pay an amount that reflects their
ability to pay relative to other taxpayers.
The misplaced emphasis on legal formalities comes into sharp focus if
you consider the case of a wholly owned corporation. In such a case, the
firm’s sole owner has complete control over the firm and is entitled to any
profits derived by the firm. As an economic matter, the firm is
indistinguishable from its owner. Yet the tax code treats the corporation
as a separate and distinct entity.23 That makes the firm–not the owner–
solely responsible for the tax on any profits it generates and retains. This
would not be particularly problematic if the corporation and its owner
were taxed at the same rate. But that is rarely the case. Given the
shortcomings of the entity classification election, scholars have offered
alternative ways to classify firms on a mandatory basis. One popular idea
is to treat small firms differently from large ones. Specifically, many
scholars argue that publicly traded firms should be classified as
corporations, while all other firms should be taxed like partnerships.24
Other scholars suggest using a different set of factors, such as whether the
firm offers its owners limited liability from the firm’s debts, to determine

20. Field, supra note 10, at 466-69.
21. E.g., George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 141,
149-50 (1999); Field, supra note 10, at 451.
22. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Introduction to Tax Policy Theory (unpublished manuscript 2018)
(describing the fundamental objectives of tax policy).
23. See Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
24. American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project – Taxation of Private Business
Enterprises (George K. Yin & David J. Shakow reps.) (1999); Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and
Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A
Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1996).
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the firm’s tax classification.25
However, these proposals are unlikely to adequately address the
inequities that now plague the taxation of business profits because they
do not account for the one factor that may be the most salient for tax
purposes: the way a firm behaves. Because the tax code conceptualizes a
firm as either an extension of its owners or as a separate and distinct
entity, any entity classification rules should focus solely on factors that
affect whether the firm behaves in one of those two ways. Such factors
might form the basis of what this Article describes as a “tax theory of the
firm.” A sound tax theory of the firm justifies a firm’s tax classification
because it accurately identifies the factors that explain certain behaviors
of the firm that are relevant and meaningful for tax purposes.
This Article proposes a tax theory of the firm by examining the origins
and evolution of the modern American approach for taxing business
profits. This approach first took shape when the Constitution was
amended to authorize Congress to impose an income tax without having
to apportion the burden among the states based on population. Up to that
point, the U.S. had a uniform rule for taxing all business profits. That rule
effectively treated all firms as extensions of their owners, a reflection of
the fact that virtually all firms were, in fact, closely held and generally
operated in partnership form.
It was only when massive corporations began to dominate the
economic landscape starting in the late 1800s that Congress introduced a
second method for taxing business profits. Although the new rules
applied to all corporations, Congress consistently recognized that closely
held corporations raised special concerns because the owners could hide
behind the entity to avoid certain tax obligations without sacrificing any
meaningful control over the assets held by the firm or the income derived
by it. For that reason, there have always been provisions that suspend
the ordinary rules for taxing corporate profits in certain cases. At first,
there was a subjective test that proved to be ineffective, leading Congress
to adopt an objective test that has since been replicated in various ways to
serve the same principal objective: to prevent taxpayers from using a
corporation to avoid the full tax on their business profits.
This Article recounts the journey that Congress took to devise an
objective way to distinguish cases where the ordinary rules for taxing
corporate profits should be suspended. This history reveals that Congress
always used concentration of ownership as the basis for making this
distinction. Moreover, the emphasis on concentration of ownership is
consistent with the insights offered by well-established economic theories

25. Jeffrey A. Maine, Linking Limited Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique of the ALI
Reporters’ Study on the Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 223 (2000).
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that attempt to explain the behavior of business firms. Such theories view
ownership of the firm as central to any understanding about how the firm
behaves vis-à-vis the owner. Thus, there is strong historical and
theoretical support to use concentration of ownership as the basis for any
meaningful tax theory of the firm. Such a theory acknowledges that a
firm can be expected to act as an extension of its owners whenever the
ownership of the firm is sufficiently concentrated. That would create a
presumption that the profits of the business should be taxed under
partnership-type rules. Conversely, if a firm lacks a sufficiently high
concentration of ownership, the firm can be expected to behave like an
entity that is separate and distinct from its owners. That would justify
taxing the firm profits under corporate-type rules.
The concentration of ownership principle plays a central role a wide
range of anti-abuse tax rules designed to prevent taxpayers from using
corporations to disguise their identities. Moreover, each of these rules
measures concentration of ownership by applying an objective test that
generally asks whether five or fewer persons own over half the value of
the company, a formulation that first appeared in a provision known as
the personal holding company rules.26 Because the “five-or-fewer”
formula and its variations have been battle tested over the years, it offers
a promising way to determine whether a firm should be treated as an entity
that is separate and distinct from its owners for tax purposes.
The 2017 Tax Act changed the Internal Revenue Code in ways that
make it more urgent than ever to reform the rules for classifying business
entities. Under prior law, the vast majority of closely held firms chose not
to be classified as corporations for tax purposes because the tax on the
firm’s profits was generally lower. Thus, closely held firms were usually
classified in the same way they would likely be classified under the
mandatory entity classification system that this Article is proposing.
However, the 2017 Tax Act changed the tax landscape in substantial
ways. It reduced the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent and
introduced a new 20 percent deduction for all firms not classified as
corporations.27 The combination of these new rules will complicate the
process of choosing the most tax advantageous entity classification for
the firm.28 At the very least, the corporate classification will become more
tax advantageous for some firms than it was under prior law. Firms that
reclassify themselves will no longer be treated as if they are an extension
26. See I.R.C. § 542(a)(2).
27. See Pub. L. No. 115-97 §§ 11011, 13001 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 11, 199A).
28. Bradley T. Borden, Income-Based Effective Rates and Choice-of-Entity Considerations under
the 2017 Tax Act, 71 NAT’L TAX J. 613 (2018); Erin Henry, George A. Plesko & Steven Utke, Tax Policy
and Organizational Form: Assessing the Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 71 NAT’L TAX J.
635 (2018).
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of their owners, even though the firm can be expected to behave in
precisely that way. The mandatory entity classification system being
proposed in this Article will help ensure that the tax consequences match
the economic realities. It will also eliminate the complexities that plague
the current system.
Part II of this Article describes the nineteenth century antecedents of
the income tax and the conditions that gave rise to a uniform approach for
taxing business profits. Part III describes the formative years of the
modern income tax when Congress first introduced a unique approach for
taxing corporate profits. Part III specifically focuses on the subjective
rules initially adopted to deter and penalize taxpayers from using
corporations to disguise their true identities. Part IV recounts the events
that culminated in the enactment of the personal holding company rules,
which not only were the first to embrace the concentration of ownership
principle, but also reduced it to an objective test. Part V examines how
the approach for taxing corporate profits evolved to where it emphatically
operates as a tax on the firm as an entity, not as an indirect tax on its
owners. Part VI describes Internal Revenue Code provisions that employ
variations of personal holding company ownership test to determine
whether the ordinary rules for taxing corporate profits should be
suspended. Part VII summarizes the principal economic theories of firm
behavior and the way they consistently revolve around a firm’s
concentration of ownership. Part VIII articulates a tax theory of the firm
and offers an initial assessment of its power and potential limitations.
Finally, Part IX concludes.
II. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE MODERN INCOME TAX
The modern U.S. income tax incorporates several key elements that
first appeared in the Revenue Acts adopted during the Civil War. Those
temporary laws contained one uniform method for taxing business profits.
Such income was consistently taxed to the owners of the business, not to
the business itself. Thus, the country’s earliest rules for taxing income
treated all firms as extensions of their owners and applied what we now
regard as the partnership model for taxing business profits. This largely
reflected the prevailing economic realities. With rare exception, all
business firms were closely held partnerships whose owners played an
active role in managing the business. Even firms that did not fit this
description routinely distributed all their earnings to their owners so that
the recipients–not the firms–were in sole possession of the firm’s profits.
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A. The 1862 Income Tax: Business Profits are Implicitly Taxed to a
Firm’s Owners at Progressive Rates
Enacted in 1862 to help finance the Civil War,29 the country’s first
income tax did not tax business firms directly.30 Instead, the individuals
who owned a share of a firm were taxed on their share of the firm’s
profits.31 Those profits, along with all other income derived by the
taxpayer, were subject to tax at one of two rates, depending on the
taxpayer’s income level. Individuals with incomes up to $10,000 were
taxed at 3 percent, while those with incomes over $10,000 were taxed at
5 percent.32 In either case, the first $600 of income was tax exempt.33
There was one exception to this general rule. The statute imposed a
three percent tax on the profits that certain financial institutions and
railroad companies paid out to their owners as dividends.34 However,
because that tax actually represented a prepayment of the tax that the
shareholders were required to pay on their share of the firm’s earnings,
the dividends were exempt from tax in the hands of the recipients.35 This
procedure did not produce any distortions or inequities because it was the
general practice for businesses of all sizes and legal forms to distribute all
their earnings to the owners.36 The three percent tax that the firm withheld
would have understated the actual tax liability for any recipient who was
subject to tax at five percent. Although the Act had no mechanism for
addressing this discrepancy, the government’s policy was to require the
29. JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 68 (1985).
The objective was to reduce the government’s need to borrow money. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, ET AL.,
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 296 (2001). As a technical matter, this was not the country’s
first income tax. In 1861, Congress enacted a 3 percent tax on income. Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, §
49, 12 Stat. 292, 309. However, the government never collected any tax under the measure because the
Treasury Secretary concluded it would cost more to collect than the government would raise, a result of a
relatively high $800 exemption. SHELDON D. POLLACK, WAR, REVENUE, AND STATE BUILDING:
FINANCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN STATE 224 (2009). See also, Steven A. Bank, Origins
of a Flat Tax, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 345 (1996). Thus, for all practical purposes, the income tax
adopted in 1862 represents the country’s first real life experience with an income tax.
30. However, certain firms had to pay a tax on their gross receipts. E.g., Act of July 1, 1862, ch.
119 § 80, 12 Stat. 468 (railroads, steamboats and ferryboats).
31. Taxable income was defined to include all profits, dividends and income “derived” from any
source whatever. Id. § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. §§ 81 and 82, 12 Stat. at 469-71. The financial institutions included banks, trust companies,
savings institutions and all fire, marine, life and inland insurance companies, whether operating as stock
or mutual institutions. Id. § 82. They also had to pay a 3 percent tax on all amounts added to their surplus
or contingent funds. Id. Railroads also had to withhold tax on interest paid. Id. § 81. The recipient was
granted a corresponding deduction for the interest. Id. § 91.
35. Id. § 91.
36. Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence from
History, 56 TAX L. REV. 463, 473 (2003).
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recipient to pay an additional two percent in tax to make up the
difference.37 Thus, the overall arrangement operated in a way that made
the tax paid by the firm a prepayment of the one owed by the recipient of
the firm’s earnings.
The government had a sound reason to require railroads and financial
institutions to pay the tax on behalf of the recipients of the income. The
legislation relied on individuals to accurately report and pay tax on any
income they derived. Instead of relying solely on the honesty of
individual taxpayers for this to happen, Congress effectively enlisted
certain firms to act as tax collection agents for the government.38
Railroads were especially well suited for this job. At the time of the
legislation, they constituted the largest and most visible commercial
enterprise in the country, making it potentially difficult and risky for them
to renege on their obligation to withhold tax on any payments.39 By
shifting the obligation to pay from the recipient to the company, the
government accomplished two things: (1) it made it easier to administer
the laws, and (2) it limited the possibility of tax evasion.40
All subsequent tax legislation enacted during the nineteenth century
followed the basic structure of the 1862 Act. Namely, each piece of
legislation imposed a tax on individuals, often under a progressive
schedule of rates. In addition, no revenue law taxed business firms as
such. Instead, they required certain firms to collect and remit the tax on
the business profits payable to the firm’s owners. A quick description of
those revenue laws will reveal just how carefully the rules were drafted
to ensure that the tax collected by the government on business profits
neither understated nor overstated the amount that would have been due
had the firm’s owners been required to pay it themselves. This
examination reveals just how strongly Congress intended to tax business
profits in a uniform way and to treat business firms as mere extensions of

37. GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE UNITED
STATES 197 (1863). One could imagine that a dividend would be overtaxed in the hands of a recipient
whose income was low enough to make them exempt from tax. However, it seems unlikely that an
individual whose income did not exceed the $600 exemption would have been in a position to invest in
dividend paying stock. This seems supported by the fact that the tax on dividends accounted for a very
small share of total income tax revenues. ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF
ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1961 – 1913, at 279 n. 74 (1993).
38. Congress modeled its system of tax collection after the British, who devised it as a bulwark
against tax evasion. See Ajay K. Mehrotra, “From Contested Concept to Cornerstone of Administrative
Practice”: Social Learning and the Early History of U.S. Tax Withholding, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 144, 15355 (2016) (describing the British experience with taxing income at its source and the extent to which it
inspired U.S. lawmakers).
39. Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 18871902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 106 (1955).
40. Frederick C. Howe, The Federal Revenues and the Income Tax, 4 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
SOC. SCI. 557, 568 (1894); Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. ECON. 416, 427 (1894).
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their owners.
B. The 1864 Income Tax: Business Profits Are Explicitly Taxed to a
Firm’s Owners at Progressive Rates
Congress more emphatically treated all firms as extensions of their
owners in all cases in the Revenue Act of 1864. This legislation amended
and restructured the income tax in order to raise additional money to
finance the Civil War.41 There were two important differences from the
Act of 1862. First, the tax rates were higher than before. Second, the
schedule of tax rates applied in bracketed fashion, which introduced a bit
of complexity into the computation of the tax. Under the bracketed
approach, an individual was exempt on the first $600 of income, a five
percent tax applied to amounts over $600 and up to $5,000, and a ten
percent tax applied to amounts over $5,000.42 Business profits were
expressly taxed to the individual owners of a firm, and it did not matter if
the firm actually distributed its profits to them.43 The government
continued to rely on certain firms as its tax collection agents, with such
firms having the obligation to pay a five percent tax on the profits derived
by the firm, whether paid out as a dividend or added to the firm’s surplus.
44

The Act used a sophisticated tax credit mechanism to ensure that the
government collected the correct amount of tax on an individual’s share
of the profits of firms enlisted to collect tax. The five percent tax paid by
the firm would understate the liability of an investor in the ten percent tax
41. Hill, supra note 40, at 423.
42. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 479, amending Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173 § 116,
13 Stat. 223, 281. Prior to the amendment, an individual was exempt on the first $600 of income, a 5
percent tax applied to amounts over $600 and up to $5,000, a 7.5 percent tax applied to amounts over
$5,000 and up to $10,000, and a 10 percent tax applied to amounts over $10,000. Congress made the
change in order to reduce a shortfall in expected revenues. STANLEY, supra note 37, at 35 (1993).
43. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 480, amending Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117,
13 Stat. 223, 282 (“[A taxpayer’s] share of the gains and profits of all companies, whether incorporated
or partnership, shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled
to the same, whether divided or otherwise.”). The regulations issued by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue left no room for doubt: an individual would be subject to tax on the undivided profits of a
corporation. See DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND REGULATIONS MADE BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, 1864 – 1898, at 16, 36, 37, 39, 40 (1906). In dictum, the Supreme Court concurred with this
interpretation. Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U.S. 1, 18 (1870). By contrast, under the prior statute, only
financial institutions were taxed on their undivided surplus; the railroads were not. See supra note 34.
44. The list was expanded to include any canal, turnpike, canal navigation or slackwater company,
in addition to the firms singled out under the 1862 Act. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 120, 13 Stat.
223, 283-84. Coincidentally, this list closely tracks the list of firms that had historically been organized
as corporations even prior to the introduction of general corporation laws. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN
STREET AND WALL STREET 21 (1973) (reprint of the 1929 edition) (observing that for long after the
adoption of the Constitution, the corporate form was not the normal form of organization except for a few
businesses like banking, insurance, turnpikes, and bridges).
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bracket. But, two rules eliminated this discrepancy. The first required
the dividend to be included in the investor’s tax base.45 The second gave
the investor credit for the five percent tax paid by the firm, leaving the
investor responsible for the difference.46 This procedure ensured that the
method for taxing business profits remained uniform across all taxpayers.
It also reaffirmed the fact that the tax on business profits was indeed the
liability of the investor, not the firm.47
C. 1867-1872: Business Profits Are Explicitly Taxed to a Firm’s Owners
at a Flat Rate
Congress simplified the tax laws in 1867 by replacing the two-tiered
graduated rates with a five percent flat tax on all income in excess of a
$1,000 exempt amount.48 Taxable income continued to include an
individual’s share of the profits of any business, and it remained irrelevant
whether the firm distributed the profits or not.49 The firms previously
enlisted to pay a five percent tax on their profits had to continue doing so,
while distributions paid by such firms remained excluded from the
recipient’s taxable income.50 This simplified structure resembled the
1862 approach. The government collected a five percent tax on all
business profits, with the tax paid by either the firm or the shareholder.
In 1870, Congress reduced the tax rate and increased the exemption, but
made no changes to the basic method for taxing business profits.51 It also
scheduled the income tax to expire after 1871, which did occur, partially
thanks to strong lobbying efforts against an income tax.52
45. See supra note 43.
46. Id. Under the legislation originally enacted in 1864, there was no provision for a tax credit.
Instead, an individual was simply not subject to tax on any dividend received from a taxable firm. See
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 281. Congress amended those rules in 1865 before its
provisions went into effect to address the possibility that specific individuals would be overtaxed or
undertaxed. See Richard Winchester, Corporations That Weren’t: The Taxation of Firm Profits in
Historical Perspective, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 501, 506 (2010).
47. The Supreme Court made this abundantly clear, too. U.S. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 84 U.S. 322
(1872). The case involved a challenge to the withholding rule as it applied to interest payments. However,
the operative provision of the statute also applied to dividends. The railroad refused to withhold tax on
interest payments made to a tax-exempt recipient. The government sued, and a unanimous court rejected
the government’s claim. Id. at 326.
48. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 477-78.
49. Id. § 13, 14 Stat. 478.
50. Id.
51. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255 § 8, 16 Stat. 258. The 5 percent levy remained in effect through
1870. Id. § 17, 16 Stat. 261. The 2.5 percent levy applied for the next two years. Id. § 15, 16 Stat. 260.
52. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255 § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257. Once hostilities between the states ended,
wealthy individuals successfully pressured the government to repeal the tax, stressing that it was a
temporary measure intended to meet the needs of the war and nothing more. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity
versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING
DEBATE 25, 29 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002); Edwin R.A. Seligman, THE
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D. The 1894 Income Tax: Congress Resurrects the Income Tax and the
Supreme Court Rejects It
Congress resurrected the income tax in 1894 in response to growing
political pressure to reform the existing system of tariffs, which reached
historic levels under the McKinley Tariff of 1890.53 Notoriously
inequitable, the tariffs effectively protected domestic manufacturing
industries from foreign competition while forcing farmers and urban
workers to shoulder the cost in the form of higher prices for manufactured
goods.54 Congress addressed the inequity by eliminating the sugar tariff
and adopting a modest income tax to make up for the lost revenue.55 The
legislation contained an income tax that resembled the one that expired in
1872. It required individuals to pay a flat two percent tax on income
above a $4,000 exempt amount.56 It also imposed a two percent tax on
the entire net income of certain business firms, whether distributed or
not.57 This time, the list of taxpayers grew to include all “corporations,
companies, or associations doing business for profit” other than
partnerships.58 As in the past, any distributions by such firms were tax
INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND
ABROAD 466-68 (1911).
53. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567. See also Sheldon D. Pollack, Origins of the Modern
Income Tax, 1894-1913, 66 TAX LAW. 295, 297-98 (2013).
54. Pollack, supra note 53, at 297-98. See also FRANK W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1888) for a definitive account of U.S. tariff policy in the nineteenth century.
55. Id. at 302, 304-05 (describing the reasons certain Republicans supported the measure). See
also Sven Steinmo, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO
FINANCING THE MODERN STATE 70 (1993) (describing the positions of populists within and outside the
Democratic Party).
56. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553. Under prior law, the tax was 2.5 percent
and the exemption was $1,000. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 477-78 amended by Act
of July 14, 1870, ch. 255 § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257. An individual’s tax base consisted of all “profits, and
income . . . of every business, trade, or profession . . . .” Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509,
553.
57. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. at 556. The Act specifically provided that:
The net profits or income of all corporations, companies, or associations shall include the amounts
paid to shareholders, or carried to the account of any fund or used for construction enlargement of
plant or any other expenditure or investment paid from the net annual profits made or acquired by
said corporations, companies, or associations.
58. Id. § 32, 28 Stat. at 556. The entire provision read as follows:
That there shall be assessed, levied, and collected, except as herein otherwise provided, a tax of
two per centum annually on the net profits or income . . . of all banks, banking institutions, trust
companies, savings institutions, fire, marine, life, and other insurance companies, railroad, canal,
turnpike, canal navigation, slack water, telephone, telegraph, express, electric light, gas, water,
street railway companies, and all other corporations, companies, or associations doing business
for profits in the united States, no matter how created and organized, but not including
partnerships.
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exempt to the recipient.59
However, the 1894 income tax never took effect because the Supreme
Court invalidated it soon after its enactment.60 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
concluded that the measure constituted a “direct” tax, which had to be
“apportioned” among the states by population in order to satisfy
constitutional requirements.61 Because the tax did not meet that
condition, the Court rejected it,62 leaving the existing system of tariffs as
the sole source of revenue for the government.
E. The 1909 Income Tax: Congress Passes Its First Tax on
Corporations
Congress passed its first tax on corporations in 1909. President Taft
introduced the legislation as a way to neutralize bipartisan Congressional
pressure for a universal income tax.63 A group of bipartisan lawmakers
proposed a tax largely modeled after the ones that preceded it. The
measure consisted of a two percent tax on all net income of individuals
and corporations in excess of $5,000. Corporate dividends were excluded
from a shareholder’s taxable income.64 In addition, in cases where an
individual’s net income fell within the $5,000 exemption, the government
would have reimbursed the amount that the company paid on the
recipient’s share of its earnings.65 Although different in certain technical
respects, the legislation would have extended the tradition of taxing all
business profits in a uniform way. The bipartisan measure eventually
attracted enough support to force a vote on it, threatening the fate of the
tariff bill.66
Firmly opposed to any form of an income tax, Old Guard Republican
leaders in Congress worked with President Taft to craft a legislative

The original draft legislation imposed a tax on business forms whose owners had limited liability. 26
CONG. REC. 1594-95 (1894) (section 59 of a proposed amendment to the tariff bill (section 32 of the Act)).
59. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. at 554.
60. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States” based on population). See also id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No capitation, or other direct, tax
shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”).
62. The decision was very controversial because it seemed to reverse what was thought to be
settled law. The Civil War income tax was considered to be an indirect tax when it was drafted. See
George S. Boutwell, The Income Tax, 160 N. AM. REV. 589, 600-01 (1895). Moreover, the Court
reaffirmed that position only 15 years earlier. See Springer v. U.S., 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
63. Pollack, supra note 53, at 316. The administration specifically considered a tax on corporate
dividends and a corporate income tax. ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 40-42 (1940).
64. 44 CONG. REC. 1352 (1909).
65. 44 CONG. REC. 3137 (1909).
66. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 33. Pollack, supra note 53, at 315.
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counterproposal.67 Their response took the form of a two percent excise
tax on the income of every corporation ostensibly for the privilege of the
limited liability protection such firms enjoyed for doing business in
corporate form.68 There were also provisions that required firms to
publicize certain financial information.69 President Taft stressed how
these provisions would give the federal government a degree of regulatory
authority over corporations so as to prevent an abuse of power.70 As part
of a strategic move to neutralize support for the bipartisan income tax
proposal, President Taft also endorsed the idea of a Constitutional
amendment that would give Congress the power to enact an income tax.71
By specifically targeting corporations, the act capitalized on the growing
unease about the ubiquitous presence of huge, unregulated commercial
enterprises in the national economy.72 It was also during this period that
it became more common to view the corporation as a separate legal entity
instead of as an aggregation of its owners.73
The bipartisan income tax proposal fell victim to the president’s
strategy and was eliminated from consideration.74 That cleared the way
for Congress to finalize the terms of the Corporate Excise Tax, which was
ultimately signed into law on August 5, 1909.75 Thus, the legislation
passed in large part because many Republicans viewed it as the lesser of
two evils. They did not like the idea of taxing corporations, but they liked
the idea of an income tax even less.76
In its final form, the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 was a one percent
tax on a corporation’s net income in excess of $5,000.77 Net income
consisted of all gross income reduced by the firm’s operating expenses,
losses, taxes, dividends received from taxable corporations, and interest
up to the amount of the firm’s paid-up capital stock.78 The firms subject

67. Pollack, supra note 53, at 316. The leadership specifically considered a tax on corporate
dividends and a corporate income tax. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 40-42.
68. See 44 CONG. REC. 3344-45 (1909) (Message from President Taft). Taft and the Congressional
leaders also considered a tax on corporate dividends and a corporate income tax. BLAKEY & BLAKEY,
supra note 63, at 40-42.
69. 44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909).
70. Id. This is very thoroughly examined by Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990).
71. 44 CONG. REC. 3345 (1909).
72. Kornhauser, supra note 70, at 55-57.
73. Id. at 57-62.
74. Pollack, supra note 53, at 317-19; BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 47.
75. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, ch. 6, § 1, 36 Stat. 11, 112-18 (1909). Certain non-profit
organizations were exempt from the Act. Although Old Guard Republicans were not thrilled with the tax,
they believed it was better than the alternative. Pollack, supra note 53, at 320.
76. See Pollack, supra note 53, at 319-20.
77. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909).
78. Id. at 113-14.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/1

14

Winchester: A Tax Theory of the Firm

2019]

A TAX THEORY OF THE FIRM

15

to tax included any corporation, joint stock company or association
having capital stock represented by shares.79 The Supreme Court upheld
the tax as constitutional, concluding it was an indirect tax that did not
have to be apportioned.80
Although labeled an excise tax for the privilege of doing business in
corporate form, a firm’s tax liability was based on its income. However,
it is not entirely clear that the measure was intended to operate as a tax on
the firm itself. There is evidence that lawmakers were attempting to reach
the wealth of the individuals who owned corporate stock.81 There is also
evidence that the measure would indirectly enable the government to
control and regulate corporations.82 Whatever may have been the
justification for the tax, it was a departure from the country’s tradition of
taxing business profits in a uniform way. The measure remained in
existence until 1913, when it was incorporated into the modern income
tax that remains in existence to this day.
F. The Economic Backdrop for the Evolving Tax on Business Profits
The government’s approach for taxing business profits necessarily
contemplated the prevailing business structures operating in the economy,
as well as the way business firms were viewed in the eyes of the law.
During the Civil War era, the typical business unit was a small, closely
held firm whose owners also managed the business.83 For these firms, the
size of the business was generally restricted by the personal wealth of the
owners.84 If the owners needed outside financing, the only viable option
was short term loans.85 Outside equity financing was almost never
sought, partly because owners did not want to give anyone else a voice in
their business.86
Throughout the nineteenth century, the dominant business form was
the partnership.87 This was particularly the case for small business

79. Id. at 112.
80. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
81. Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 447, 452 (2001).
82. Kornhauser, supra note 70.
83. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 2 (1940 ed.) (1932); Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 107.
84. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 83, at 2.
85. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 107.
86. Id.
87. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the Plight of
Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM:
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 125, 129 (Edward L. Glaser and Claudia Goldin eds.,
2006); Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 109-112.
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firms.88 During the first half of the nineteenth century, the ubiquity of
partnerships largely reflected the absence of an alternative. Until midcentury, corporate charters were only available through a special grant
from the legislature.89 However, these special charters were severely
criticized during the Jacksonian period as a source of political bribery and
monopoly power.90 That characterization fueled a nationwide push for
statutes that made the act of incorporation universally available to anyone.
Between 1850 and 1870, such general incorporation laws gradually
became the norm throughout the country.91 However, when incorporation
became an option, small firms did not choose it in large numbers.92 That
is because the corporate form was ill suited to the needs of a closely held
firm.93 Such business ventures valued having a measure of flexibility in
allocating ownership, control, and income rights; corporations were too
rigid a structure to accommodate that need.
Perhaps most importantly, participants in an incorporated venture had
virtually no practical way to exit the venture. They were locked into the
venture because there was unlikely to be an efficient market for shares in
a small firm, leaving an owner unable to separate himself from the venture
by selling his shares to a buyer. This was a particularly unattractive
feature in light of the fact that small firms faced a greater risk of being
commandeered by an oppressive participant or incapacitated by deadlock
between the participants. By contrast, partners in a partnership enjoyed a
presumptive right to withdraw from the venture at any time, even though
doing so could effectively force the business to dissolve.
Corporations had the advantage of offering shareholders the
presumption that they enjoyed limited liability for the debts and
obligations of the firm.94 However, during the early years of free
incorporation, this rule frequently had to yield to higher legal authority.
During the Civil War era, most states had constitutional or statutory
provisions holding shareholders of an insolvent corporation liable for
more than the value of their shares.95 The most typical provision, adopted
in almost every state, imposed double liability on a corporation’s
88. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 129; Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman &
Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1395 (2006).
89. Martin J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA.
L. REV. 173, 181 (1985).
90. Id.; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J.
1593, 1635 (1988).
91. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 181.
92. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 129; Hansmann, et al., supra note 88, at 1335, 1395.
93. Hansmann, et al., supra note 88, at 1395; Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 128.
94. See Hovenkamp, supra note 90, at 1651-1658 (recounting the origins and evolution of limited
shareholder liability).
95. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 208.
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shareholders.96 In some cases, the shareholders’ exposure was even
greater.97
Putting aside constitutional and statutory rules, courts would assert the
Trust Fund Doctrine to hold innocent shareholders who purchased their
shares at a discount liable for the difference between the stock’s par value
and the purchase price.98 The Trust Fund Doctrine was honored for most
of the nineteenth century until it became the target of attacks during the
1890s. Over time, the doctrine lost its vitality, in part because of the rise
of a national stock market, which definitively converted shareholders to
impersonal investors.99
Considering all the tools available to creditors of an insolvent
corporation during the nineteenth century, one scholar has concluded that
truly limited shareholder liability was far from the norm in America even
as late as 1900.100 Thus, even the virtues of limited liability may not have
offered a benefit that would have permitted the corporate form to
represent an appealing alternative to the partnership, which satisfied what
may have been an overriding priority for someone investing in a small
business: a way to get out. The corporate form gradually became more
attractive as a vehicle for operating smaller firms starting in the late
nineteenth century, when courts began to recognize the power of the firm
to restrict the transferability of shares.101 However, that power was not
firmly established until well into the twentieth century.102
Historical data reflects the overwhelming popularity of the partnership
form for smaller firms. In 1900, two-thirds of all manufacturing firms
owned by more than one person were organized as partnerships.
Moreover, firms operating as partnerships were significantly smaller than
those choosing to incorporate in that year. Partnerships accounted for
$2.57 billion of goods produced, while corporations accounted for $7.73
billion even though they were vastly outnumbered by partnerships.103
Small firm incorporations increased at a steady pace over the next
decades, but large numbers of partnerships were also formed. These
statistics confirm that the closely held, small firm was almost always a
partnership during the nineteenth century, and that the partnership
remained the overwhelming entity of choice well into the twentieth
century for the small business venture.
96. Id.
97. See 3 S. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS VI, chs. 46,
50 (1st ed. 1895)
98. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 208.
99. Id. at 209.
100. Id. at 208.
101. Hansmann, et al., supra note 88, at 1396.
102. Id.
103. Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 129.
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Meanwhile, the largest firms were consistently organized as
corporations throughout the nineteenth century and beyond. The railroads
were the most prominent example during the Civil War era. Railroads
favored the corporate form because it permitted them to raise the large
amounts of capital that the business would require, while leaving the
management of the firm in the hands of a small team of professionals.104
In other words, the corporate form made it possible to separate a firm’s
owners from its managers. Indeed, the very features that made the
corporate form unappealing to a closely held business made it well suited
to the needs of a large, capital-intensive business that could not be
supported solely by the wealth of its owner-managers.
Initially, the largest firms took the form of trusts, not corporations.
Such trusts arose during the 1880s when firms in the processing sector
faced stiff price competition, leading companies in particular industries
to search for a way to manage their activities on a coordinated basis.105
The first consolidated enterprise to operate as a trust was Standard Oil,
which was formed in 1879 under the leadership of John D. Rockefeller.106
The trust was better suited than the corporation for this task at that time
partly because state statutes did not permit corporations to own shares in
other corporations.107 Nor could such firms operate across state lines.108
Those limitations did not apply to a trust. Trusts were not conceived as a
device for obtaining capital from passive investors. To the contrary, the
owners of the trusts were typically the partners of the firms that comprised
the trust.109 Thus, even when trusts emerged as a source of economic
power, the owner-managed firm remained the dominant model, even for
the largest industrial ventures. However, over time, these large
commercial enterprises would evolve into ones that were characterized
by large numbers of passive owners and a small team of professional
managers.
The trend away from the owner-managed firm started during the 1880s
when owners of trusts became interested in disposing of their shares. The
New York Stock Exchange accommodated them by allowing the trading
of trust certificates on an unlisted basis.110 By the end of the 1880s, the
trading volume was so high that the exchange eclipsed the Boston Stock
Exchange as the country’s preeminent stock market.111 More importantly,

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Hovenkamp, supra note 90, at 1595.
Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 112.
Id.
Id.
Horwitz, supra note 89, at 191.
Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 113.
Id. at 115.
Id.
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from the 1880’s onward, securities of all types became an increasingly
attractive investment vehicle and the ownership of business firms became
more dispersed and mobile. In short, the emergence of an organized
securities market facilitated the gradual transition from an economy
dominated by small owner-managed firms to one dominated by huge
commercial enterprises with widely dispersed, passive investors.
Meanwhile, the corporation became a more attractive way to conduct
business on a large scale. The key event occurred in 1889 when New
Jersey amended its incorporation statute to permit corporations to own
stock in other corporations.112 The amended statute also permitted
incorporation for any lawful purpose, offering virtually unlimited
flexibility to corporate managers. Soon thereafter, other states followed
suit.113
The shift to the corporate form coincided with a shift in the
management structure of the largest firms. Those firms were traditionally
managed by their owners. However, firms gradually began to rely on
passive investors for a portion of their equity capital. The trend
accelerated and intensified during the 1890s as a result of two factors.
First, existing trusts and partnerships incorporated themselves, with the
owners taking advantage of the developing market for industrial securities
to liquidate part of their investment. The usual pattern would be for the
owners to issue common stock to themselves, while issuing nonvoting
preferred stock to executives, employees, distributors and members of the
general public.114 Second, there was an unparalleled wave of industrial
combinations that occurred starting in the mid-1890s through 1904, a
period referred to as the Merger Movement.115 The issuance of preferred
stock was a key element of these transactions, too.116
Preferred stock had several attractive features. First, it was a fixed
income instrument that could be more easily priced than common stock
by investors who had little knowledge of the issuer’s business.117 Second,
compared to common stock, it was more acceptable to an investing public
that was accustomed to the regular interest payments that would be paid
on a bond.118 Meanwhile, preferred stock enabled the company to obtain
needed capital in a less expensive and less risky way than by issuing debt

112. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 195.
113. Id.
114. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 120, 123.
115. NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 18951904 (1985). More than 1,800 firms disappeared into consolidations during this period. Id. at 2.
116. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 122.
117. JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE
152 (1999).
118. Id.
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or by borrowing money.119 Industrial proprietors and corporate managers
liked issuing nonvoting preferred stock to new investors because that
enabled them to liquidate part of their investment without endangering
their position of control and their ability to exploit the company for their
own personal objectives.120 By contrast, voting power seemed to have
little value to small investors whose holdings were unlikely to be large
enough to translate into a meaningful voice in corporate governance.121
Bankruptcy risk was a third consideration. Bankruptcies were common
during this period, even among the largest U.S. corporations. In that
context, preferred stock gave managers greater control over payments to
investors when financial conditions were not ideal.122 The popularity of
preferred stock is significant in that its use permitted ownership and
management of the largest corporations to become separate in fact, not
just in theory.
The net effect of these events caused the American economy to
undergo a drastic transformation between 1890 and 1916.123 It began as
a period dominated by owner-managed firms operating in largely
unregulated competitive markets. That was the context in which
Congress adopted the uniform rules for taxing business profits. By the
end of 1916, the economy was dominated by relatively few large
corporations with passive owners and professional managers operating in
a regulated market. This different context led Congress to reconsider the
merits of a uniform rule for taxing business profits.
The distribution practices of publicly traded corporations also changed
considerably over the years. In the period preceding the First World War,
it was the accepted practice for all firms to distribute nearly all of their
earnings, no matter what the firm’s size or legal form.124 This had always
been the universal norm for partnerships.125 Firms operating in corporate
form observed the same practice for two principal reasons.126 First, those
119. Navin & Sears, supra note 39, at 116.
120. Id. at 116, 119 (1955); BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 117, at 153.
121. BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 117, at 153.
122. Id. at 155.
123. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 18901916 (1988).
124. ROBERT SOBEL, THE GREAT BULL MARKET: WALL STREET IN THE 1920S 32 (1968) (“Before
the [First World] war, most large corporations considered earnings after taxes and payments to
bondholders and preferred stockholders a “surplus,” and much of this was divided among the common
stockholders. This meant that such firms would have to depend heavily upon the capital markets for funds
needed for expansion, and large bond issues were considered normal.”); Bank, supra note 36, at 473.
125. SHAW LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE
DEVELOPMENT 232 (1939).
126. This was the case even though directors had considerable power to withhold payments to
shareholders, and there were a variety of rules limiting shareholder access to profits. For example,
dividends had to be paid exclusively from the profits of the firm, as opposed to any funds contributed by
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firms were simply not in the habit of disclosing financial information to
anyone, as financial reporting of any kind did not start to occur until the
twentieth century.127 That made the distributions of profits the principal,
tangible way a firm could telegraph how well it was doing and to establish
a value for its stock.128 Second, in the absence of dividends, there would
be no way for someone to realize a return on an investment in corporate
stock.129 Today, the existence of an organized stock market offers
investors the option to sell their shares to someone else. However, an
organized and efficient stock market did not arise until well into the
twentieth century.130 Therefore, companies that issued stock before that
market arose had to observe liberal dividend policies in order to attract
individuals to invest in a relatively illiquid asset.131 The emergence of an
organized stock market gave firms the freedom to retain a greater share
of their earnings and to distribute a smaller share to their investors. Such
a shift in distribution practices made it difficult to justify a tax policy that
required the investor to pay tax on their share of a firm’s earnings that
they did not actually receive and could not access.
G. Evolving Legal Conceptions of the Firm
Treating a firm as an extension of its owners—and not as a separate
and distinct entity—was not a concept that was unique to tax law.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century and beyond, business entities
of all kinds were not viewed as having a legal identity apart from their
owners. This was especially true for partnerships, which consistently had
been viewed as contractual arrangements that did not produce a separate
and distinct legal entity. Instead, the partnership was merely an
aggregation of the partners.132
The legal status of the corporation evolved over the years. During the
early part of the nineteenth century, the corporation was viewed as an
the shareholders. VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 435 at
410 (2d ed. 1886). Second, the board of directors possessed complete discretion to determine whether
and when to pay a dividend. Cyrus LaRue Munson, Dividends, 1 YALE L.J. 193, 196 (1891).
127. Bank, supra note 36, at 468-472.
128. Id.
129. BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 117, at 19.
130. A number of stock exchanges did exist during this period. However, they were still evolving
and handled a very narrow range of securities for an even more limited clientele. ROBERT SOBEL, INSIDE
WALL STREET: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE FINANCIAL DISTRICT 28-33 (1977). In 1877, for
example, there were only 163 stocks and 334 bonds listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange,
with most of them representing railroads, banks and local industries. The Boston Stock Exchange
overshadowed the NYSE for industrial securities. Id. at 32.
131. Once the securities markets developed, the emphasis on dividends was replaced by a focus on
earnings. R.W. SHABACKER, STOCK MARKET THEORY AND PRACTICE 411-12 (1930).
132. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 181. See also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1914).
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artificial entity.133 That was consistent with the observed reality. Prior to
1850, the only way to secure a corporate charter was through an act of the
legislature.134 However, such special charters were severely criticized
during the Jacksonian period for encouraging bribery and favoritism.135
That criticism fueled a nationwide push for statutes that made the act of
incorporation universally available. By 1870, every state in the union had
enacted such laws.
The availability of so-called “free incorporation” called into question
the idea of the corporation as an artificial entity. The immediate response
was to view a corporation as a contractual arrangement analogous to a
partnership.136 In fact, around the time of the Civil War, the leading
treatise on corporations described corporations as “little more than limited
partnerships.”137 Moreover, through the 1880s, there was a strong
tendency to analyze corporation law not much differently from the law
governing partnerships.138 Because those rules embraced a view of the
firm as an aggregation of individuals, all powers of the firm derived from
the rights of the individuals who comprised it.139 This tendency to elevate
the role of the individual may have partly reflected the anti-corporate and
anti-consolidation bias that characterized the period.140
Even though the law initially drew few distinctions between
corporations and partnerships, legal theorists vigorously debated whether
a corporation was a mere aggregation of individuals or whether it was
indeed a real entity that was separate and distinct from the individuals
who compose it.141 Perhaps the first prominent judicial decision that
adopted the idea that a corporation was a separate legal entity came in
1886, when the U.S. Supreme Court casually declared in Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad that a corporation was a person under
the Fourteenth Amendment and entitled to the protection granted by its
provisions.142 The Court was hesitant to completely equate the status of
corporations with that of individuals. Instead, it conferred parity on a case
by case basis in a series of decisions involving discrete constitutional
rights.143
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Horwitz, supra note 89, at 181.
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id. at 182.
JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE, 766 (John Lathrop ed. 7th ed. 1861) (1832).
138. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 203-04.
139. Id. at 182.
140. Id. at 186.
141. Id. at 182, 185.
142. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
143. Horwitz, supra note 89, at 182.
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In the interim, the entity theory gained momentum and the laws of
partnerships and corporations moved in radically different directions.
There are two particularly illuminating examples of this trend. The first
involved the level of shareholder approval required to undertake a major
transaction. Traditionally, it was necessary for a corporation to obtain
unanimous shareholder consent to undertake a merger or other
fundamental change. The rule was one example of the tendency to view
corporations as merely a contractual arrangement similar to a
partnership.144 However, by the time of the Merger Movement at the turn
of the century, nearly all states had passed statutes permitting such
transactions to proceed with less than unanimous shareholder consent.145
The common law rule of unanimous consent was also eroded by a
consistent line of judicial decisions. The combination of trends led one
contemporary scholar to observe that by 1926, there was “hardly a state .
. . where the dominant common law rule . . . ha[d] not been abrogated by
statute or decision.”146
In a similar fashion, views on the role of the directors shifted in a
dramatic way. Traditionally, the shareholders were considered to possess
all the powers of the corporation, with the board acting as their agents and
lacking any inherent power to appoint subagents.147 Such a view is
consistent with the idea that the corporation is a contractual arrangement.
By 1931, however, the leading treatise on the power of corporate directors
reflected a dramatic change in legal opinion, explaining how modern
decisions emphasized “the directors’ absolutism in the management of the
affairs of large corporations.”148 This observation was consistent with the
prevailing realities: in a world where corporations regularly merged and
individuals held diversified portfolios of industrial securities,
shareholders were no longer “co-entrepreneurs,” but merely passive
investors.149
Given the state and structure of business activity during most of the
nineteenth century, it is easy to see why Congress adopted a uniform rule
for taxing business profits as part of the nation’s first experiment with an
income tax. Virtually all firms were, in fact, managed by their owners,
regardless of the legal form adopted by the business. In the rare case
where the firm did not meet this description, taxing the owners on their
shares of a firm’s profits did not produce any distorted outcomes because
firms, in fact, distributed all their earnings to their owners. Moreover,
144. Id. at 200.
145. Id.
146. Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547 (1927).
147. ANGELL & AMES, supra note 137, at 257.
148. H. SPELMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE DIRECTORS,
4-5 (1931).
149. Id.
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taxing firms in a uniform way was an extension of the law’s uniform
views about the nature of business organizations. However, that uniform
legal status had to be reconsidered as the economy evolved to be
dominated by huge industrial enterprises with widely dispersed passive
owners and a small team of professional managers. The tax rules had to
be reconsidered to reflect that new reality, too.
III. THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE MODERN INCOME TAX
A. 1913: Congress Adopts Two Approaches for Taxing Business Profits
The income tax adopted in 1913 contained, for the first time, two
different approaches for taxing business profits. One approach applied to
profits derived through a corporation; the other applied to the profits
derived through all other business firms. The legislation accomplished
this through a system consisting of three separate taxes: a corporate tax, a
normal tax on individuals, and a surtax on individuals. The combination
of rules interacted in such a way that the individual normal tax and surtax
applied to the profits of any unincorporated firm. The tax on corporate
profits depended on whether the firm distributed the profits to its
shareholders or not. If the firm paid dividends to the owners, the tax on
the profits were no different than if they were derived by a partnership or
another unincorporated business. However, any profits the firm did not
distribute were only subject to the corporate tax.
Individuals were subject to a normal tax and a surtax.150 The normal
tax was a one percent flat tax on an individual’s net income in excess of
an exempt amount.151 An individual’s net income would include his share
of the profits of any partnership, whether those profits were distributed or
not.152 However, net income did not include any corporate dividends.153
Instead, all dividends and any undistributed corporate profits were subject
to a one percent tax imposed on the corporation.154 Thus, the tax paid by
a corporation was the functional substitute for the normal tax that would
have been paid by the recipient of any dividend.155 The overall structure
150. Revenue Act of 1913, § II.A.2, 38 Stat. 114, 166.
151. Id. § II.A.1, 38 Stat. at 166. The exempt amount depended on a person’s marital status. An
unmarried individual was allowed to exclude the first $3,000 from the normal tax, while married couples
were collectively allowed to exclude the first $4,000. Id. § II.C., 38 Stat. at 168.
152. Id. § II.D., 38 Stat. at 169.
153. Id. § II.B., 38 Stat. at 167.
154. The corporate tax applied to “every corporation, joint-stock company or association, and every
insurance company, organized in the United States, no matter how created or organized, not including
partnerships. . . .” Id. § II.G.(a), 38 Stat. at 172. The Act’s corporate tax replaced a corporate excise tax
that was in effect since 1909. 50 CONG. REC. 509 (statement of Rep. Hull) (1913).
155. However, because the normal tax only kicked in when an individual’s income exceeded the
exempt amount, an individual whose income fell below that threshold would have been overtaxed on his
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of the normal tax was very similar to the revenue measures enacted in the
nineteenth century.
Meanwhile, the surtax on individuals was a progressive tax that
included a schedule of six rates ranging from one to six percent.156 The
members of Congress broadly agreed on the overall structure of the surtax
and how it should apply to individuals.157 However, lawmakers labored
long and hard before adopting an approach for applying the surtax to
business profits.158
The application of the surtax to business profits was not expressly
addressed in the original bill reported out of the House Ways and Means
Committee and later passed by the full House.159 The Senate Finance
Committee addressed the issue directly by amending the bill to include a
provision that required an individual to pay surtax on his share of the
profits of any business, whether incorporated or not, as long as the
taxpayer would be “legally entitled to enforce the distribution or division
of the same.”160 The drafters inserted this language out of an apparent
concern that both partnerships and corporations would start reducing the
amount of profits they distributed to their owners in an attempt to prevent
those profits from being subject to the surtax.161
share of any corporate profits.
156. The rates applied in a graduated way with the 1% tax applying to net income above $20,000
and up to $50,000, while the 6% rate applied to amounts in excess $500,000. Id. § II.A.2., 38 Stat. at 166.
157. The Senate Finance Committee did not recommend any changes to this aspect of the tax as
proposed by the House Ways and Means Committee and adopted by the full House of Representatives.
Compare S. REP. NO. 80 (1913) with H.R. REP. NO. 5 (1913).
158. Indeed, Senator Williams stated that it “gave us more trouble than anything” in the bill. 50
CONG. REC. 5318 (1913).
159. See H. R. REP. NO. 5 (1913). See also J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938-1861, 983-84 (1938). Indeed, the entire bill was relatively
uncontroversial in the House where the Democrats held a large majority. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note
63, at 83.
160. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 983. This provision was adopted despite concerns voiced over
the ability of individual shareholders to ascertain their share of a firm’s profits and the possibility that the
amounts so taxed would be taxed again when distributed by the firm. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63,
at 86.
161. Senator Williams offered this explanation in response to a question raised by Senator Root on
the floor of the Senate:
That language, “if divided or distributed,” is somewhat awkward, and for that very reason we want
it to go back to the committee; but the object of the amendment was this: Here is a partnership,
for example; the partners might make a very large amount of money, but they can effect an
agreement whereby, instead of setting aside to each partner his income for that year, they allow it
to go into the business, each partner to draw against the firm and make a showing of having no
income at all from the partnership. Then, it was thought that for the purpose of obtaining revenue
a corporation might now and then pass up a portion of its profits to surplus or otherwise refrain
from distributing them.
50 CONG. REC. 3774 (1913) (statement of Sen. Williams). The idea of taxing an individual on a portion
of firm profits not actually received by him was not new. The Revenue Act of 1864 set a precedent for
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However, once the bill reached the floor of the Senate, lawmakers
questioned the validity of permitting the undistributed profits of a
corporation to be considered the income of any shareholder given that a
shareholder had no power to force a corporation to pay a dividend.162 For
that reason, the provision was sent back to the Committee for further
consideration.163 The Committee modified the provision by requiring
firm owners to pay surtax on their share of the undistributed earnings of
a business only in those cases where the undistributed amounts were
beyond the reasonable needs of the business.164 This approach seemed to
acknowledge the emerging view that it was prudent for corporations to
that. Under that legislation, the profits of a business were expressly taxed to the individual owners,
regardless of whether the business was incorporated and regardless of whether the profits were paid out
to the owners. Act of June 30, 1864, § 117, 13 Stat. at 282 (“[T]he gains and profits of all companies,
whether incorporated or partnership . . . shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income
of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.”). Under the interpretation of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the amounts taxed to an individual included the undivided profits of
a corporation. See DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND REGULATIONS MADE BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, 1864-1898, at 16, 36, 37, 39, 40 (1906). In dictum, the Supreme Court concurred with this
interpretation in Collector v. Hubbard. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870). Taxing partnerships and corporations
in the same way under a uniform rule seems to be consistent with the prevailing view about the nature of
a partnership and a corporation. At the time, both business forms were considered to be an aggregate of
its owners. See Kornhauser, supra note 70, at 58.
162. This seems to be clear from the following exchange between Senators Root and Williams on
the floor of the Senate:
Mr. ROOT. Mr. President, before the amendment goes back to the committee, I desire to ask
that the committee consider the question whether it is possible that the gains and profits referred
to in this provision can be regarded as the income of the individual stockholder when they are not
divided or distributed. As I understand, this clause would have the effect of imposing an income
tax on the aliquot share of each stockholder of a corporation in that part of the profits of the
corporation for the year which might have been distributed but were not distributed.
Mr. WILLIAMS. Not precisely that; but such part of the income of the partnership or corporation
as a partnership or shareholder would have the legal right to force the distribution of . . . .
Mr. ROOT. But taking it altogether, particularly considering the concluding words, I think it
does aim to tax as income of the stockholder the profits of the corporation which are not divided .
. . I understand the law to be – I think it is the law in all of our States – that no stockholder has a
right to demand a dividend from the profits of a corporation against the judgment of the directors
or trustees of the corporation.
50 CONG. REC. 3774 (1913) (statements of Sens. Root and Williams). There was little concern about the
longstanding practice of taxing partners on their share of partnership profits. This likely reflects the fact
that by the time the Revenue Act of 1913 was under consideration, a partnership had generally come to
be viewed as an extension of its owners, not as a separate entity. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 1914).
163. However, Senator Borah openly noted that if the committee decided not to apply the surtax to
undistributed corporate profits, Congress would have to contend with reducing the risk that large estates
would incorporate in order to escape the surtax. 50 CONG. REC. 3775 (1913) (statement of Sen. Borah).
164. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 984. Before deciding to limit the rule in this way, the Committee
received the input of the Southern Railway Company, which cautioned against a rule that would put firms
in the position of having to defend a decision to reinvest profits in the business. See 50 CONG. REC. 4379
(1913).
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legitimately retain some portion of their annual earnings for future
reinvestment.165 The Committee continued to draw no distinction
between corporations and other businesses. Thus, the revised rule applied
to both incorporated and unincorporated firms.166
Additional language was added on the Senate floor to help clarify that
the surtax would only reach those instances in which an intention to avoid
tax motivated the decision not to distribute or divide the profits of the
business. Specifically, owners would be taxed on their share of
undistributed profits only when the companies (whether incorporated or
not) were “formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing
the imposition of such [surtax] through the medium of permitting such
gains and profits to accumulate.”167 Senator Williams explained the
objective of the language: “It applies only to such profits and the heaping
up of such surplus as shall justify the Secretary of the Treasury in
concluding that it is done for the purpose of evading the tax. Its main
purpose is to prevent the formation of holding companies.”168
Under the compromise, the individual surtax would apply in two
different ways depending on whether the profits were derived from an
incorporated business or not.169 In the case of an unincorporated business,
like a partnership, each owner would have to pay the surtax on his share
of the profits of the business whether or not the share was actually
distributed to the partner.170 This rule essentially replicated the approach
taken for purposes of the normal tax. However, if the business was a
corporation, the conferees took a two-pronged approach. First, each
shareholder was required to pay surtax on any corporate profits actually
distributed to him as a dividend.171 Second, the shareholders would also
165. Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889,
918 (2006).
166. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 983.
167. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 984; BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 92.
168. 50 CONG. REC. 4380 (1913) (statement of Sen. Williams). The Senate Finance Committee’s
adoption of a uniform rule for taxing the undistributed profits of partnerships and corporations seems odd.
Elsewhere in the legislation, the Committee specified that the partners of a partnership (but not the
shareholders of a corporation) would have to pay tax on their share of firm profits, whether distributed or
not. 50 CONG. REC. 3855 (1913) (“Provided further, That any persons carrying on business in partnership
shall be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity, and the share of the profits of a partnership
to which any taxable partner would be entitled if the same were divided, whether divided or otherwise,
shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid, under the provisions of this section, . . . ”). In any event,
the bill was reconciled in the Conference Committee, which revised the legislation to prevent the surtax
from having two inconsistent rules for taxing undistributed partnership profits.
169. SEIDMAN, supra note 159, at 983-84.
170. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.D., 38 Stat. 114, 169 (“Provided further, That any persons
carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity, and the
share of the profits of a partnership to which any taxable partner would be entitled if the same were
divided, whether divided or otherwise, shall be returned for taxation and the tax paid, under the provisions
of this section, . . . ”).
171. But cf. id. § II.B., 38 Stat. at 167 (allowing an individual to exclude dividends from taxable
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have to pay surtax on their share of any profits that were not distributed
if the corporation’s failure to do so was motivated by a desire to prevent
the application of the surtax.172
This latter provision has become known as the “accumulated earnings
penalty.” It was distinctive in part because it was not self-executing.
Instead, the government had to detect cases of unlawful conduct and
assess the tax. When it did, the government would have to establish that
the failure to distribute profits was motivated by the desire to avoid tax.173
However, by the terms of the legislation, the mere fact that the gains and
profits were permitted to accumulate and become surplus was not to be
construed as evidence of a purpose to escape the surtax unless the
Secretary of the Treasury certified that such accumulation was
“unreasonable for the purposes of the business.”174 Thus, only certain
instances of undistributed surplus would be the target of the penalty based
on the theory that there were certain legitimate accumulations of surplus
that could be distinguished from illegitimate accumulations. However,
Congress left it to the Secretary of the Treasury to draw these distinctions.
In any year that the penalty tax applied, the noncompliant firm was taxed
similar to a partnership for purposes of the surtax, with the shareholders
having to pay tax both on amounts they actually received and their share
of any undistributed profits for the year.175
income for purposes of the normal tax only).
172. Id. § II. A.2., 38 Stat. at 166 (“For the purpose of [the surtax] the taxable income of any
individual shall embrace the share to which he would be entitled of the gains and profits, if divided or
distributed, whether divided or distributed or not, of all corporations, joint-stock companies, or
associations however created or organized, formed or fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing
the imposition of such tax through the medium of permitting such gains and profits to accumulate instead
of being divided or distributed . . . . ”).
173. The Act identified two factors that could independently be relied upon as prima facie evidence
of a fraudulent purpose to escape the surtax. First, if the corporation was a mere holding company, that
would constitute such prima facie evidence. Second, the fact that the corporation permitted its gains and
profits to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business would also constitute such prima facie
evidence. Id. § II.A.2., 38 Stat. at 167.
174. Id.
175. It would be incorrect to say that the firm and its shareholders were treated in a way that was
identical to a partnership and its partners. A partner was not taxed on amounts actually received by the
partnership. Rather, a partner was taxed solely on the partner’s share of profits derived by the partnership
in a given year, while any actual distributions were tax free to the partner. By contrast, under the rules of
the accumulated earnings tax, a shareholder remained subject to tax on any profits actually received from
the corporation as a dividend. If in a later year, such a dividend consisted of amounts that were previously
taxed to the shareholder under the accumulated earnings tax, that dividend would remain subject to tax.
There was no provision exempting such a dividend from the surtax. To that extent, the tax seems to
operate as a penalty. However, writing at a more contemporaneous time, one scholar concluded that the
provision was “not, strictly speaking, a penalty statute.” Lucius A. Buck and Francis Shackelford,
Retention of Earnings by Corporations Under the Income Tax Laws, 36 VA. L. REV. 141, 153 (1950). It
is important to note that this particular scholar reached this conclusion without considering whether
shareholders would be taxed on dividends consisting of profits that were previously taxed to them under
the accumulated earnings rules in prior years. The one penal quality he did identify was the fact that the
“surtax” would apply to amounts “the corporation could have accumulated to meet its reasonable needs.”
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In the end, the rules for taxing business profits created an incentive for
individuals to utilize corporations as a tax shelter. While all partnership
profits were subject to as much as seven percent in tax, corporate profits
would be subject to that rate only when they were actually distributed to
shareholders. Corporate profits that were retained by the firm were only
subject to the one percent corporate tax.
Congress granted tax relief to undistributed corporate earnings for two
reasons. First, it did not want to make individual shareholders pay surtax
when the shareholder was not in a position to effectively access the
earnings. Second, Congress did not want a tax to influence decisions
about ways to finance corporate investments. A tax on undistributed
corporate profits would have discouraged firms from relying on such
funds at a time when it was considered to be a responsible and prudent
practice to retain such earnings and not to pay all profits out as a dividend.
Thus, the unique way of taxing corporations was designed to
accommodate a specific business structure: a firm whose managers could,
and did, deploy the firm’s earnings in a way that served the interests of
the firm.
Despite the sound rationale for taxing corporate profits in a unique
way, Congress understood how this unequal system of taxation could be
abused. Lacking a sufficiently precise test to distinguish between
impermissible and permissible cases of undistributed profits, Congress
essentially delegated the task to the Internal Revenue Service with
instructions to inquire into the taxpayer’s intent.
The was not an easy one for the Treasury to execute. Part of the
Treasury’s difficulties can be traced to the inherent complexities in
enforcing a rule that required establishing taxpayer intent. Its difficulties
also stemmed from the fact that the disparity in the taxation of
undistributed corporate profits and other business profits grew larger over
time, increasing the incentive for firms to retain earnings beyond
permissible levels.176 The government was simply ill-equipped to
respond to taxpayer efforts to avoid the surtax. As explained in the next
section, Congress made a variety of adjustments to the accumulated
earnings penalty in order to improve its effectiveness, but the provision
Id. By that measure, however, it would seem that the approach for taxing partnerships also had a penal
quality, since—under those rules—partners were not relieved of surtax on their share of partnership profits
retained by the firm to meet its reasonable needs. As a matter of Congressional intent, however, the
legislative history for the 1913 Act contains no evidence that lawmakers consciously intended a double
tax to apply. In fact, Congress affirmatively rejected such an idea five years later when it revised the
accumulated earnings tax. Those amended rules expressly exempt from the surtax future distributions of
amounts that were previously taxed to shareholders. There is no evidence that the change was motivated
by a desire to ease the burden of the tax. To the contrary, as later sections of this Article will illustrate,
Congress consistently tried to strengthen it.
176. Richard Winchester, Parity Lost: The Price of a Corporate Tax in a Progressive Tax World, 9
NEV. L.J. 130 (2008).
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consistently proved to be an ineffective tool to address tax evasion.
B. 1918: The Government Can Explicitly Tax Certain Corporations Like
Partnerships
Five years after enacting the accumulated earnings tax, Congress
adjusted the remedy provided by the law. Under the revised version of the
tax, the corporate income tax simply would not apply to any corporation
that fraudulently accumulated earnings. Instead, the shareholders had to
pay tax on their share of firm profits as if they were members of a
partnership.177 Thus, both the normal tax and the surtax would apply to
each shareholder’s share of firm profits, whether the taxpayer received
any or not.178 In other words, the remedy emphatically treated the
corporation as a partnership. This change effectively declared that any
corporation falling within the scope of the statute should not be respected
as such.
C. 1921: Certain Corporations Can Choose to be Taxed Like
Partnerships
By 1921, Congress had to reconsider the remedy imposed under the
accumulated earnings tax in light of a 1920 Supreme Court decision that
cast doubt on the constitutionality of taxing shareholders on the
undistributed profits of a corporation.179 In response, Congress replaced
the shareholder tax with a 25 percent tax on the corporation.180 Under the
1921 Act, all corporations were subject to a 12.5 percent corporate tax,181
177. The statute specifically required the firm to be subject to a newly enacted set of rules that
applied to so-called personal service corporations. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 220, 40 Stat. 1057,
1072. Under those rules, the shareholders had to pay tax on their share of firm profits as if they were
members of a partnership. Id. § 218(e), 40 Stat. at 1070. For a more complete description of the personal
service corporation rules, see Richard Winchester, Corporations That Weren’t: The Taxation of Firm
Profits in Historical Perspective, S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 501, 518-20 (2010).
178. The application of the rule appeared to be quite cumbersome. The Treasury declared in an
early pronouncement that “[w]hether a corporation is taxable under section 220 can not be determined in
advance; it must be determined at a later date in the light of what it has actually done with the profits
retained.” T.B.M. 2, 1 C.B. 181 (1919). The implication is that the corporation and its shareholders would
report income and pay tax as if the provision did not apply. If the government determined that the
provision did apply, then adjustments would have to be made at both the firm level and the shareholder
level to conform to reverse the original treatment and to conform to partnership treatment.
179. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). The Eisner Court concluded that a shareholder
could not be taxed on the value of a dividend paid in the form of stock in the dividend paying corporation.
H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 12-13 (1921); S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 16 (1921). Prior to the decision in Eisner,
the practice of taxing shareholders on their share of a corporation’s undistributed profits was never directly
tested in the courts. See Harry J. Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, 49 YALE L. J. 171, 174 and note 18 (1939) (discussing cases).
180. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 227, 247.
181. Id. § 230, 42 Stat. at 252.
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which meant that a total of 37.5 percent in tax would be imposed on
undistributed corporate earnings when the accumulated earnings penalty
applied.182
As an alternative to the 25 percent corporate tax, the 1921 Act
permitted the government to waive the accumulated earnings penalty if
the shareholders agreed to be taxed on their share of firm profits as if the
firm were a partnership.183 This election was only available when the
government determined that the corporation had unlawfully accumulated
profits.184 Here again, the changes made to the accumulated earnings tax
continued to reflect the idea that not all corporations are the same and
some behave in ways that would require taxing the firm as a partnership,
not a corporation. However, the line dividing those firms from all the
others remained vague and elusive, a continued sign of Congressional
ambivalence about its approach.
D. 1924: Congress Repeals the Option to Tax Certain Corporations
Like Partnerships
In 1924, Congress eliminated the aforementioned election for a
corporation to be treated like a partnership.185 In that year, lawmakers
were acutely aware that the accumulated earnings tax did not have a very
good track record of discouraging tax avoidance.186 This time, however,
182. In addition, in the even the firm distributed the earnings in future years, the shareholders would
have had to pay a surtax of up to 50 percent on the dividends. Id. § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37. Although
that was significant, it was still lower than the total tax imposed on corporate dividends and partnership
profits. Under the 1921 Act, corporate dividends were taxed as high as 77.5 percent, while partnership
profits were taxed as high as 73 percent. The 77.5% tax on corporate dividends consisted of the corporate
tax and the individual surtax. Id. § 230, 42 Stat. 227, 252 (12.5% corporate tax); id. § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat.
at 235-37 (individual surtax up to 65%). The 73% tax on partnership profits consisted of the normal tax
and the surtax on individuals. Id. § 210, 42 Stat. at 233 (normal tax up to 8%); id. § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at
235-37 (individual surtax up to 65%).
183. Id. § 220, 42 Stat. at 247-48. This procedure would apply only if the shareholders unanimously
agreed to it and if the Commissioner also consented. Id.
184. Id. § 220, 42 Stat. at 248.
185. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 220(a), 43 Stat. 253, 277.
186. During the floor debates on the 1924 Act, Senator George Norris of Nebraska observed that
the use of corporations to evade surtax was a routine device for evading the surtax:
Everybody knows that it is quite common for men to escape taxation on incomes from Liberty
bonds by organizing corporations really for the purpose of holding those Liberty bonds, and thus
escaping the surtaxes they would have to pay if they owned them individually.
65 CONG. REC. 7359 (1924) (statement of Sen. Norris). The minority report of the Senate Finance
Committee expressed its frustrations this way:
It is true a penalty against the organization of a corporation for the sole purpose of evading taxation
is included in the present law and increased in the proposed bill. In actual result, however, such
penalty provision has been and will be for all practical purposes a nullity. The penalty of the
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the congressional response was to increase the penalty tax payable by the
corporation to fifty percent, a level that was considered high enough to
adequately deter any excessive retention of profits because it far exceeded
the tax that would otherwise apply.187 Under the 1924 Act, all
undistributed corporate profits remained subject to a 12.5 percent
corporate tax.188 Meanwhile, corporate dividends were taxed as high as
52.5 percent189 and a tax of up to 46 percent was imposed on partnership
profits.190 A 50 percent penalty on top of a 12.5 percent corporate tax
would have resulted in a total tax that exceeded the tax burden on either
corporate dividends or partnership profits.
In that respect, the 1924 Act was different from its predecessors. Under
the prior revenue laws, whenever a firm fell within the scope of the
accumulated earnings tax, the rules effectively taxed the corporation’s
profits as if they were derived by a partnership. That was no longer true
under the 1924 Act. However, as will be evident in the following sections,
it was not long before Congress returned to its habit of simply treating a
corporation’s profits as if they were derived by a partnership.
E. 1926: Shareholders Have the Option to Pay Tax on Undistributed
Corporate Earnings
Under the Revenue Act of 1926, Congress retained the fifty percent
penalty that could be imposed on any corporation that fell within the
scope of the accumulated earnings tax.191 However, Congress also
allowed firms to protect themselves from any exposure to the penalty if
all of the shareholders paid tax on their share of the firm’s undistributed
profits as a constructive dividend.192 Subsequent distributions of amounts
present law has only been applied in one or two cases. The Secretary testified before the
committee that corporations were not being availed of so as to result in a decrease in taxation.
Before another committee of the Senate, a prominent attorney from the city of New York testified
that such was generally being done. We believe that so long as the inducements exist in the law
they will be availed of by interested taxpayers.
S. REP. NO. 68-398, pt. 2, at 9 (1924).
187. S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 26 (1921).
188. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 230, 43 Stat. 253, 282. The Senate passed a measure that
would have imposed an additional tax on a corporation’s undistributed earnings. 65 CONG. REC. 8033
(1924). However, that proposal was eliminated from the bill reported by the Conference Committee. H.R.
REP. NO. 68-844, at 21 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 300, 305. See also Bank, supra note 36, at 50304.
189. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 230, 43 Stat. 253, 282. (12.5% corporate tax); id. § 1200, 43
Stat. at 353 (individual surtax up to 40%).
190. Id. § 210(a), 43 Stat. at 264 (normal tax up to 6%); id. § 1200, 43 Stat. at 353 (individual surtax
up to 40%).
191. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 220(a), 44 Stat. 9, 34.
192. Id. § 220(e), 44 Stat. at 34-35.
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that were previously taxed to the shareholder under this rule were
expressly exempt from the shareholder’s normal tax and any surtax.193 In
the event a firm’s shareholders did not elect to pay tax on their share of
the firm’s profits, the fifty percent penalty would have been a significant
price to pay compared to the alternatives. Under the Act, corporate
dividends were subject to an aggregate tax of up to 33.5 percent,194 while
the tax on partnership profits was as high as 25 percent.195
The option for shareholders to pay tax on a constructive dividend was
distinctive from its predecessor in two important respects. First, the
option was available to any corporation; it was not limited to those that
the Treasury had already accused of failing to distribute sufficient
earnings to shareholders.196 Second, under this option, the firm’s earnings
were subject to both the corporate tax and the shareholder tax on
dividends, which essentially respected the firm as a separate and distinct
entity. By contrast, the existing rule simply treated the firm as if it were
a partnership and eliminated the tax at the firm level. This option to
pretend that the firm paid a dividend remained available to taxpayers until
1938.197 It was an example of another congressional attempt to disregard
legal formalities in order to ensure that the rules for taxing business profits
applied in a coherent way.
This historical review shows that during the formative years of the
modern income tax, Congress felt constrained by two concerns: (1) the
desire not to penalize firms that set aside earnings as part of a prudent
practice to finance future investments, and (2) the inequity of taxing
undistributed earnings to shareholders who simply could not access them.
In later years, the need to resolve these tensions became more pressing,
leading Congress to experiment with objective ways to measure whether
a corporation should be taxed as such.
193. Id. Interestingly, this provision was added to the bill by the Senate Finance Committee, which,
in 1924 removed a similar measure from the revenue bill. Under that rejected measure, if the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue concluded that a corporation had been availed of in order to evade the
individual surtax, the shareholders could have elected (with the Commissioner’s consent) to be taxed on
their respective shares of the corporation’s net income for the year. See text accompanying note 183. Such
an election would have been a substitute for the corporate penalty tax.
194. Id. § 230(a)(2), 44 Stat. at 39 (13.5% corporate tax); id. § 211(a), 44 Stat. at 22-23 (maximum
20% tax on dividends).
195. Id. § 210, 44 Stat. at 21 (maximum 20% normal tax); id. § 211(a), 44 Stat. at 22-23 (maximum
20% surtax).
196. Id. § 220(e), 44 Stat. at 34.
197. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 104(d), 45 Stat. 791, 815; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209,
§104(d), 47 Stat. 169, 195; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 102(d), 48 Stat. 680, 702; Revenue Act of
1936, ch. 690, § 102(d), 49 Stat. 1648, 1677. In its place, the 1938 Act permitted the penalty to be
determined after reducing the firm’s undistributed earnings by “consent dividends,” which were amounts
of undistributed earnings that the shareholders agreed to include in their taxable incomes. See Harry J.
Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 YALE
L.J. 171, 180 (1939).
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IV. EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE CONCENTRATION OF
OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLE
Unsatisfied with its subjective approach for dealing with tax avoidance
opportunities created by the inconsistent way of taxing business profits,
Congress began to consider legislation that utilized a more objective
mechanism for policing abuse of the corporate form. That process began
in 1928 and culminated with the 1938 personal holding company rules.
A. 1928: The Concentration of Ownership Principle First Appears in
Legislation
The first tax legislation to include an objective method for
distinguishing corporations appeared in 1928. Congress ultimately
decided to retain the accumulated earnings penalty adopted in 1926.
However, that only occurred after lawmakers devoted time considering
an alternative that would serve as the template for future legislation that
eventually got signed into law.
That process began when Congress authorized a Joint Committee to
investigate the administration of the tax laws.198 That Committee
produced a report that documented the Treasury’s track record of
enforcing the accumulated earnings tax.199 The chairman of the
Committee, Representative William Green of Iowa, described the
creation and use of corporations to avoid the surtax as “the most fruitful
method of tax evasion.”200 Indeed, by one estimate, the government was
deprived of $168 million between 1922 and 1925 as a result of
corporations that were used to accumulate earnings and prevent the
imposition of the surtax.201 Despite this reality, the Treasury Department
had pursued very few cases and had not collected one dollar in revenue
as a result of their efforts.202 The agency offered two explanations for its
performance. First, it was the agency’s position that an investment
company had an unlimited need for accumulated profits. In addition, the
agency had a policy not to pursue closely held corporations whenever
such firms had invested their surplus earnings in expansion or the
acquisition of other businesses.203 These positions were surprising
because they effectively exempted from tax precisely the cases that
198. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27 § 1203, 44 Stat. 9, 127-28.
199. Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Tax’n, 69th CONG., DIV. OF INVESTIGATION, vol. 1 – pt. 3,
REP. ON EVASION OF SURTAXES BY INCORPORATION (SECTION 220) (Comm. Print 1927) (hereinafter
1927 Tax Evasion Report).
200. WILLIAM RAYMOND GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN TAXATION 114 (1933).
201. Id. at 116 (citing NATIONAL INCOME TAX MAGAZINE, Apr. 1927).
202. 1927 Tax Evasion Report, supra note 199, at 38.
203. Id. at 33-34.
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Congresses intended to reach when it adopted the provision.204 Indeed,
from the very beginning, a corporation’s status as an investment company
or holding company was prima facie evidence of an intent to evade the
surtax. In order to rectify the situation, the report concluded that Congress
might consider replacing the existing provision with one that operates
“more automatically.”205
In 1928, the Committee on Ways and Means reported a bill that
addressed corporate tax shelters in two separate ways. First, the bill
reduced the existing accumulated earnings tax from 50 percent to 25
percent, reasoning that the existing penalty was unduly harsh.206 Second,
the bill added a new provision targeted at so-called personal holding
companies.207 Under the proposed rules, a corporation would have to pay
a 25 percent tax whenever its undistributed earnings exceeded a certain
threshold and the firm satisfied a net income test and an ownership test.208
The net income test was satisfied whenever the firm derived at least 80
percent of its net income from certain passive sources.209 The ownership
test was met whenever ten or fewer individuals directly or indirectly
owned at least 80 percent of the company’s voting power or value.210 The
Committee believed that this class of corporations was most likely to
accumulate surplus in order to evade individual surtaxes on corporate
earnings.211
Although the Committee viewed the provision as a tool to combat the
use of corporations to avoid the individual surtax, it is not clear what may
have informed the specific approach it decided to take. The income test
seems to be influenced by the 1927 report, but the origin of the ownership
test is a bit of a mystery. The Committee proposal focuses on
concentration of ownership. That idea is not reflected in any witness
testimony. Nor does it appear to be supported by any research or study,
including the 1927 report. Six years earlier, the British enacted a rule to
address the use of corporations to avoid tax.212 That legislation employed
a concentration of ownership test to identify the firms that fell within the

204. Id. at 36. The statute always declared that it would be prima facie evidence of a purpose to
escape the surtax if a corporation were a mere holding company. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 6, §
II(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114, 167. Starting in 1924, being an investment company had the same effect. See
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 220(b), 43 Stat. 253, 277.
205. 1927 Tax Evasion Report, supra note 199, at 54.
206. H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 18 (1927).
207. Id. at 17-18.
208. Id. The tax applied if the undistributed earnings exceeded 30 percent of the amount consisting
of the firm’s net income, dividends and tax-free interest.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 17.
211. Id.
212. Finance Act 1922 § 21 (12 & 13 Geo.) ch. 17 (U.K).
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scope of the law. However, that test required five or fewer persons to
possess a majority of the voting power or shares in the company.213 So,
if the Committee was influenced by the English approach, that influence
appears to have been limited to embracing the general concentration of
ownership principle.214 The Committee adopted its own formula to
implement the principle. Whatever the rationale for the personal holding
company rules, they apparently responded to a concern that was of great
interest to the general public. The New York Times saw fit to run a page
one article that contained the actual text of the proposed personal holding
company bill as passed by the Committee.215
Members of the House reacted positively to the personal holding
company proposal, viewing it as both a way to address the Treasury’s
failure to enforce the accumulated earnings penalty tax, and as an
effective way to single out firms that were merely a front for their
owners.216 Nevertheless, there were still lingering questions about
whether the provisions were sufficiently tailored to not apply to firms that
were not mere vehicles to avoid the surtax.217
The House accepted the personal holding company proposal without
objection.218 Members of the Senate, on the other hand, stressed the
shortcomings of using a bright line rule, criticizing it as an “arbitrary” and
“inflexible” approach that would penalize some firms that were observing
sound and legitimate business practices.219 The Finance Committee
stressed that the need for the rule was declining since the disparity
between the individual and corporate tax rates was shrinking, reducing
the incentive to utilize corporations as a tax shelter.220 The Finance
Committee also believed that certain changes made to the accumulated
earnings tax in 1924 and 1926 made it easier to administer, as evidenced
213. Id. § 21(6).
214. The English were a source of inspiration for other aspects of U.S. tax law. The practice of
collecting tax at its source was an idea that American lawmakers borrowed from the British. Blakey,
supra note 63, at 78-79; Ajay K. Mehrotra, “From Contested Concept to Cornerstone of Administrative
Practice”: Social Learning and the Early History of U.S. Tax Withholding, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 144, 153155 (2016).
215. Tax Bill Reported Promptly to House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1927, at 1.
216. 69 CONG. REC. 519 (1927) (statement of Rep. Garner); Id. at 521 (statement of Rep. Green).
217. Id. at 520 (statement of Rep. Green).
218. Id. at 518-21.
219. S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 12 (1928). Those objections were similar to those made during the floor
debates in the House and the Senate. It was also consistent with the views of certain individuals who
testified at the hearings. Representatives of the National Association of Real Estate Boards criticized the
lines drawn by the ownership test because they penalized the actions of ten shareholders, while not
penalizing the same actions of eleven shareholders. Treadway Demands Revised Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 1928, at 10. The real estate lobby was among the interest groups to insist that Congress reject
the proposal. Long Island Board Endorses Tax Brief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1928, at 176. See also, 69
CONG. REC. 7976-77 (1928) (statements of Sen. Simmons and Sen. King).
220. S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 12.
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by the fact that the Treasury seemed to be imposing the tax in a greater
number of cases.221 Indeed, the report produced by the Joint Committee
showed that enforcement increased dramatically in 1925 and 1926.222 The
higher level of enforcement may also reflect some pressure that the
Treasury Department received from Chairman Green.223
The House yielded to the Senate when the bills were reconciled by the
Conference Committee.224 Two factors may explain why the personal
holding company rules did not survive. First, Chairman Green indicated
in later years that it was always difficult to enact legislation directed at
combating tax avoidance because many members of Congress were
simply opposed to the income tax itself.225 Resistance in the Senate may
have been particularly strong because the rules encountered opposition
from organized wealth. 226 In addition, by the time the bill was referred
to the Conference Committee, Representative William Green himself had
been appointed to the U.S. Court of Claims. Not only did he chair both
the Joint Committee and the House Committee on Ways and Means, the
personal holding company rules were his brainchild.227 His absence may
have deprived the rules of their most articulate advocate. Indeed, he was
very frustrated by the Treasury Department’s failure to enforce the
accumulated earnings tax and even threatened to bring Department
officials before Congress.228
Whatever the reasons, Congress declined to employ a more objective
and meaningful way to distinguish corporations whose undistributed
earnings were entitled to tax relief from those that were not. Although
the bill did not pass, reaction to it showed that a growing number of
members were prepared to reject the fiction that shareholders never have
the power to force a distribution, at least in the context of the closely held
corporation.
B. 1934: Congress Reduces the Concentration of Ownership Principle
to an Objective Formula
In 1934, Congress enacted rules that contained an objective method of
221. Id. Presumably those changes included the fact that the agency had to start treating as prima
facie evidence of a tax avoidance purpose the fact that the firm was an investment company. That was
always the case for holding companies.
222. 1927 Tax Evasion Report, supra note 199, at 38. The Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed the
tax 52 times between 1919 and 1926. Forty-one of those assessments were for the last two years.
223. 75 CONG. REC. 6979 (1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).
224. H. REP. NO. 70-1882, at 14 (1928).
225. GREEN, supra note 200, at 115.
226. 75 CONG. REC. 6979 (1932).
227. Id. at 6978-79 (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).
228. Id. at 6979 (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).
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identifying corporations whose undistributed profits would not be taxed
under the rules that ordinarily applied to corporations. The rules were
included in the Revenue Act of 1934 as a completely new tax regime that
applied in place of the accumulated earnings penalty tax whenever a
corporation qualified as a personal holding company.229 In order to so
qualify, the company could not be a bank or trust company and it had to
satisfy a gross income test and an ownership test.230 A corporation passed
the gross income test if at least eighty percent of its gross income for the
year consisted of certain passive items of income, like dividends and
interest.231 A corporation passed the ownership test if five or fewer
individuals owned (directly or indirectly) over fifty percent of the value
of the corporation’s outstanding stock at any time during the last half of
the year.232 If a corporation satisfied these two tests, it had to pay a thirty
percent surtax on the first $100,000 of any “undistributed adjusted net
income,” and a forty percent surtax on any undistributed amounts in
excess of $100,000.233 This surtax took the place of the shareholder level
tax that would have been triggered had the firm actually paid a dividend.
If a corporation did not qualify as a personal holding company, it
remained exposed to the accumulated earnings tax.234 However, neither
tax would apply in any year all the shareholders voluntarily included in
their gross income a fictional dividend representing their share of the
corporation’s net income for the year.235 In those cases, the shareholders
would not be taxed on the receipt of any actual dividend consisting of
these previously taxed amounts.236
The personal holding company rules were part of a larger effort to
increase revenues by preventing tax avoidance, thereby eliminating the
need to increase tax rates.237 The rules accomplished this objective by
operating “automatically,” without the need for the government to
establish a taxpayer’s intent to avoid tax.238 By one conservative estimate,
personal holding companies caused the government to lose more than $1

229. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277 § 351(a), 48 Stat. 680, 751.
230. Id. § 351(b)(1), 48 Stat. 751.
231. Id. § 351(b)(1)(A), 48 Stat. 751.
232. Id. § 351(b)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 751. An attribution rule caused certain members of a family to
count as one individual for these purposes. Id. § 351(b)(1)(C)-(E), 48 Stat. 751-52.
233. Id. § 351(a), 48 Stat. 751.
234. Id. § 102(a), 48 Stat. 702. Congress reduced the penalty from 50% to 25% because a 50% tax
would have exceeded the tax that would have been imposed on an actual distribution, making it difficult
for the provision to be readily enforceable. H. REP. NO. 73-704, at 12 (1934).
235. Id. § 351(d), 48 Stat. 752.
236. Id.
237. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 356.
238. H. REP. NO. 73-704, at 12 (1934). The rules were expected to generate $25 million in revenue
each year. PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE, infra note 242 at 8.
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billion in tax over the years prior to the enactment of this new rule.239
Although the personal holding company rules were foreshadowed by
the 1928 proposal, they were specifically the product of a Ways and
Means subcommittee240 whose charge was to investigate a wide range of
tax evasion techniques and to propose solutions.241 The subcommittee
considered personal holding companies as the most prevalent form of tax
avoidance practiced by wealthy individuals.242 Referring to the technique
as the incorporated pocketbook, the report described this form of tax
avoidance like this: “[A]n individual ‘forms a corporation and exchanges
for its stock his personal holdings in stock, bonds, or other incomeproducing property. By this means the income from the property pays
corporation tax, but no surtax is paid by the individual if the income is not
distributed.’”243 The subcommittee sought to target the most obvious and
noncontroversial cases with an objective test that applied automatically,
while allowing the Internal Revenue Service to use its judgment to assert
penalties under the accumulated earning tax in situations that were not as
clear cut.244
The subcommittee’s proposal was structured in much the same way as
the 1928 proposal in that it contained three principal elements: (1) a gross
income test, (2) an ownership test, and (2) a formula for computing the
tax. The gross income test was not modified from the one proposed in
1928.245 However, the proposal included significant changes to both the
ownership test and the formula for computing the tax.
The ownership test continued to focus on concentration of ownership.
However, the subcommittee’s proposal required a higher concentration of
ownership—five or fewer individuals owning over fifty percent,
compared to ten or fewer individuals owning over eighty percent.
Furthermore, under the earlier proposal, concentration of ownership could
be measured in terms of either voting power or rights to dividends. By
239. GREEN, supra note 200, at 140.
240. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 347. The Roosevelt Administration did not take the
lead in drafting the tax legislation during that legislative session. JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 98 (1985).
241. H.R. RES. 183, 73d Cong. (1933).
242. SUBCOMM. OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73d CONG., 2d SESS., PREVENTION OF TAX
AVOIDANCE: PRELIMINARY REPORT RELATIVE TO METHODS OF PREVENTING THE AVOIDANCE AND
EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION
AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF 6 (Comm. Print 1933) (hereinafter PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE).
243. Id. It was one of many practices uncovered by an investigation conducted by the Senate
Banking Committee. 78 CONG. REC. 2662 (1934) (statement of Rep. Samuel B. Hill).
244. Revenue Revision, 1934, Hearings Before the Comm. On Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 55 [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Jere Cooper describing the collective thinking of the
subcommittee).
245. Both proposals counted the following items as passive income: rents, royalties, interest,
dividends, annuities and gains from the sale of securities.
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contrast, the 1934 proposal applied solely to voting stock, further limiting
the number of cases falling within the scope of the new tax. Both changes
made the provision more targeted.
One modification to the ownership test occurred when it was debated
on the floor of the House. The House rejected the idea of using only
voting stock to measure concentration of ownership, replacing it with the
rule that considered all shares of stock—both voting and nonvoting. The
change was adopted without objection. Indeed, the House of
Representatives entertained very little debate on any aspect of the entire
income tax bill, for two reasons. First, the members simply deferred to the
work of the subcommittee because the subject matter was so technical.246
Second, debate on the bill was limited to 16 hours with amendments being
restricted to those offered by the committee,247 which made it virtually
futile to question any aspect of the proposal.248 Still, it is noteworthy that
the specific formula for measuring concentration of ownership was not
contested or questioned at later points in the legislative process either.
The noncontroversial nature of the ownership test could reflect the fact
that the subcommittee invested a good deal of time crafting it, resulting
in a formula that produced a broad-based legislative consensus.249
The formula for computing the resulting tax was substantially revised
between the 1928 proposal and the 1934 proposal. In both years, the tax
was imposed on the portion of a firm’s undistributed earnings that
exceeded an exempt amount of its net income for the year. However, the
exempt portion was substantially reduced from thirty percent to ten
percent. The subcommittee believed that the vast majority of the firms
singled out by the proposal were formed for the sole purpose to avoid the
imposition of the surtax,250 which increased the willingness of the
subcommittee to minimize the amount of earnings that a firm should be
permitted to retain.
Although relatively modest in scope, the personal holding company
rules are a milestone in the way the government taxed business profits.
Lawmakers were always concerned that using legal formalities as the sole
basis for distinguishing firms would produce inequities. They relied on
the accumulated earnings penalty tax to address those inequities on a caseby-case basis before they could identify an objective and systematic way
246. BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 63, at 356.
247. Id.
248. The bill passed by an overwhelming majority: 390 to 7. 78 CONG. REC. 3005 (1934).
249. During an exchange with Roswell Magill of the Treasury Department, Subcommittee member
Jere Cooper said that the subcommittee “worked some time to get [the] definition. Hearings, supra note
244, at 55. The definition consists of both the gross income test and the concentration of ownership test.
Because the gross income test is identical to the one incorporated into the 1928 proposal, the statement
implies that the deliberations were focused on the ownership test.
250. PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 242, at 7.
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to do so. The personal holding company ownership test accomplishes that
task by asking whether the firm’s concentration of ownership exceeds the
“5 or fewer” threshold.251 The test reflects the fundamental reality that
the interests of the firm and those of its owners overlap whenever
ownership of the firm is sufficiently concentrated. Isolating firms whose
interests aligned with those of its owners is imperative when the payment
of a dividend partly determines the total tax on corporate profits. It is
only when those interests overlap that the corporation would be inclined
to consider the impact of the shareholder tax when deciding whether to
pay a dividend. Otherwise, the shareholder tax would be largely
irrelevant to the firm.
In future years, both the concentration of ownership principle and the
specific threshold articulated in the personal holding company rules
would be adapted and extended to other situations. One particularly
meaningful fortification was included in the Revenue Act of 1936.252
That legislation did not disturb the core “5 or fewer” requirement,253 but
it did incorporate a new provision describing how stock owned by certain
entities would be treated as owned by their owners.254 This rule
supplemented an existing rule that required certain groups of related
persons to count as one individual for purposes of the test.255 An even
more elaborate set of attribution rules appeared in the Revenue Act of
1937.256 Together, these changes helped ensure that taxpayers could not
divide their shareholdings among related persons to avoid satisfying the
ownership test.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TAX ON CORPORATE PROFITS
While Congress experimented with ways to address the use of
corporations to avoid tax, the disparities in the taxation of business profits
grew more pronounced over time, underscoring the need for an effective
way to distinguish the cases where the corporate tax rules would apply
from those where they would not.
Congress initially devised two separate ways for taxing business profits
in 1913 because changes in the distribution practices of firms made it
difficult for the existing uniform rules to function without producing
251. The 5 or fewer formulation brought the American approach very close to the one adopted by
the British in 1922. In its own version of personal holding company anti-tax avoidance legislation, a firm
was subject to the law if 5 or fewer persons possessed over 50 percent of the firm’s voting power or shares.
Finance Act of 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5 c. 19, § 21(6) (12 & 13 Geo.) ch. 17 (U.K.).
252. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648.
253. See id. § 351(b)(1)(B), 49 Stat. at 1732.
254. Id. § 351(b)(1)(C), 49 Stat. at 1732.
255. Id. § 351(b)(1)(D), 49 Stat. at 1732.
256. Id. § 354(a) (added by Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 1, 50 Stat. 813, 815-816).
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distortions. When it was routine for firms to distribute all their earnings,
the tax system produced no meaningful inequities for taxpayers who were
required to pay tax on their shares of a firm’s profits. However, such a
rule produces distortions and inequities once firms start to retain
substantial portions of their annual earnings. Lawmakers faced that
dilemma in 1913, leading them to adopt a set of rules that allowed
undistributed corporate earnings to be partially taxed while all other
business profits remained fully taxed.
The difference in the applicable rates was not very large during the first
few years. Therefore, the distortions and disparities were not significant
enough to merit much attention. However, that changed when the country
entered World War I, leading Congress to experiment with ways to reduce
the inequities. The Revenue Act of 1917 included surtax rates up to 50
percent, at a time when corporations appeared to be retaining roughly half
their annual earnings.257 Leaving such a substantial sum exempt from the
surtax would simply deny the treasury too much revenue. To address this,
Congress considered a number of options, including a fifteen percent tax
on all undistributed profits.258 Ultimately, Congress chose to simply raise
the corporate tax rate 2 percentage points above the normal individual
rate, effectively making the corporate tax less of a substitute for the
normal tax on the shareholders and more a freestanding tax on the firm.259
The debate on the taxation of corporate retained earnings continued to
simmer in the 1920s, but Congress did not make any changes until the
early 1930s when the country was preoccupied with identifying a cause
for the Great Depression.260 The unreasonable accumulation of corporate
profits was a prime suspect because the practice was believed to upset the
balance between consumption and production, resulting in the
misallocation of economic resources.261 So, to fill a budget gap, President
Roosevelt proposed a tax on undistributed corporate profits, viewing it as
a way to discourage corporations from hoarding earnings.262 Despite
opposition from corporate management, Congress passed the measure,
while also keeping the existing corporate tax and eliminating the rule that
made corporate dividends exempt to shareholders.263 The undistributed
profits tax was substantial, ranging from seven percent to twenty-seven
percent.264 Meanwhile, the corporate tax ranged from eight percent to
257. Steven A. Bank, The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, 30 J. CORP. L.
1, 18-19 (2004).
258. Id. at 19-20.
259. Id. at 20-22.
260. Bank, supra note 36, at 494-506.
261. Bank, supra note 257, at 22-23.
262. Id. at 24.
263. Id. at 25-28.
264. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1656.
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fifteen percent.265 The combination of measures helped transform
corporations into separate taxpaying entities, not merely agents for
collecting a tax imposed on the shareholders.
By 1938, corporate managers successfully lobbied to eliminate the
undistributed profits in exchange for an increase in the corporate tax rate
to 19 percent.266 The change removed the disincentive to retain earnings,
while leaving dividends to be taxed at both the firm level and the
shareholder level. For corporate managers, the double taxation of
corporate dividends was not an ideal outcome, but it was preferable to a
tax on undistributed earnings because such a tax would have interfered
with their discretion over the firm’s retained earnings.267
This system of double taxing corporate dividends remains the most
distinctive feature of the American system for taxing corporate profits
today. Among other things, it undeniably treats the firm as a separate and
distinct entity, making it more important to restrict that approach to cases
where there is a meaningful basis for treating the firm and its owners as
separate and distinct taxpaying units.
VI. VARIATIONS OF THE CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLE
ENACTED INTO LAW
Over the years various iterations of the ownership test embedded in the
personal holding company rules have been incorporated into several other
anti-tax avoidance provisions. Each of them suspends the application of
the conventional rules for taxing corporate profits and effectively apply a
variation of the rules that would apply to partnerships and other
unincorporated business entities. At the very least, the pattern suggests
that Congress is satisfied that the concentration of ownership principle is
an effective and meaningful way to distinguish corporations that behave
as extension of their owners from those that do not.
A. Foreign Personal Holding Companies
In principle, the personal holding company rules and the accumulated
earnings penalty tax should apply regardless if a corporation is domestic
or foreign. However, foreign corporations present a special problem
because they are beyond the taxing jurisdiction of the U.S., making it
impossible to enforce any anti-abuse rule that requires such a corporation
to pay tax. Thus, absent a special rule, a taxpayer could simply transfer
certain income producing assets to a foreign corporation to skirt their
265. Id. § 13(b), 49 Stat. at 1655.
266. Bank, supra note 257, at 29.; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 13(c), 52 Stat. 447, 455.
267. Bank, supra note 257, at 29-30.
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obligation to pay tax on their worldwide income.268 This made it
necessary for Congress to adopt a different approach.
The answer came in the form of the foreign personal holding company
rules. The rules, passed by Congress in 1937, required any U.S.
shareholder of a foreign personal holding to pay tax on his share of the
corporation’s undistributed earnings as a constructive dividend.269 In
order to determine whether a firm qualified as a foreign personal holding
company, the statute applied a gross income test and an ownership test.270
The latter test was borrowed from the personal holding company rules but
adapted for foreign corporations. Specifically, the statute asks whether the
five or fewer individuals are either U.S. citizens or residents.271 These
entities were believed to serve the same purpose as their domestic
counterparts. In the words of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau,
“[o]ne characteristic runs through all [the efforts to avoid tax]. It is the
creation of a multiple personality in the taxpayer.”272 Quite simply,
individuals were masquerading as corporations to avoid their full tax
obligations.
Although the personal holding company rules provided an antecedent
for the ownership test, the idea of taxing the owners on their share of the
firm’s profits was one Congress had deliberately abandoned in 1921 out
of fear that it might be unconstitutional.273 No doubt, the absence of an
alternative for collecting the tax compelled Congress to resurrect that
approach in the context of foreign personal holding companies. However,
Congress also noted that Canada had already taken a similar approach for
addressing foreign personal holding companies.274 Whatever the reason,
because the statute requires the firm’s owners have to pay tax on their
share of the firm’s earnings, the firm’s status as an extension of its owners
becomes more explicit.
The foreign personal holding company rules were repealed in 2004,
once Congress concluded that they served no purpose in light of the rules
addressing controlled foreign corporations and passive foreign
investment companies, adopted in 1962 and 1986, respectively.275
268. This technique would insulate foreign source income from U.S. tax. The U.S. source earnings
would be subject to tax under §§ 881 and 882 (2019).
269. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690 § 331 et seq. (added by Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815 § 201, 50
Stat. 813, 818).
270. Id. § 331, 50 Stat. at 818.
271. Id. § 331(a)(2), 50 Stat. at 818.
272. Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Hearings Before the J. Comm. on Tax Evasion and Avoidance,
75th Cong. 11 (1937) (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury).
273. Supra, note 179 and accompanying text.
274. Tax Evasion and Avoidance, Report of the J. Comm. On Tax Evasion and Avoidance of the
Cong. Of the U.S., 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1937).
275. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357, § 413, 118 Stat. 1418, 1506-1510.
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B. Controlled Foreign Corporations
Although effective in other regards, the foreign personal holding
company rules did not reach situations involving a foreign corporation
that was a wholly owned subsidiary of a widely held U.S. corporation.
Thus, if a publicly traded company formed a subsidiary in a low tax
foreign jurisdiction, none of the earnings derived by that subsidiary would
be subject to U.S. tax. This result directly violates the general U.S. policy
to require U.S. taxpayers to pay tax on their worldwide incomes. To
address this gap in the law, Congress enacted subpart F of the Internal
Revenue Code.276
The rules in subpart F generally require certain U.S. shareholders in
certain foreign corporations to pay tax on their share of a portion of the
foreign corporation’s earnings. Only corporations that qualify as
controlled foreign corporations (“CFCs”) fall within the scope of the rule.
When a corporation so qualifies, a portion of its undistributed earnings
will be taxed directly to the U.S. owners who own at least 10 percent of
the firm’s voting power or value.277 Only if such 10 percent owners
collectively own over 50 percent of the vote or value of the foreign
corporation will the firm qualify as a CFC.278 In short, a foreign
corporation will not be a CFC if its five largest shareholders each own
exactly ten percent of its shares, because those shareholders will own
exactly fifty percent of the firm’s value. However, if just one of those
shareholders owns over ten percent of the shares, that group of
shareholders will collectively own over fifty percent of the firm’s value,
causing the firm to qualify as a CFC. In essence, these rules are another
iteration of the “five-or-fewer” formulation that appears in the personal
holding company ownership test.
In fact, when the subpart F provisions were first proposed, one early
idea was to apply the foreign personal holding company tax to certain
foreign base companies where five or fewer corporations held more than
fifty percent of the stock.279 That would have effectively made each of
the foreign corporation’s shareholders liable for tax on their entire share
276. The government was well aware of the gap for years. It deliberately did not address it, viewing
the tax benefit as a way of promoting American investment and private enterprise in “free world”
countries, which served America’s economic and geo-political interests. Government policy did not shift
until concerns about the balance of payments gained greater prominence. Vasujith Ram, Contextualizing
the History of Subpart F, 161 TAX NOTES 315 (Oct. 15, 2018).
277. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(A) (2019).
278. I.R.C. § 957(a) (2019).
279. See Revenue Act of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 3458 (1962) [hereinafter 1962 Hearings] (statement submitted by N.R. Danielian of
the International Economic Policy Association). See also id. at 3785 (New York State Bar Association
Report on Foreign Income Provisions of Revenue Bill of 1962, H.R. 10650) and id. at 3932 (statement
submitted by Thomas G. Corcoran).
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of the company’s undistributed profits. However, the Ways and Means
Committee ultimately reported a bill that only required a firm’s ten
percent shareholders to pay tax on a certain portion of the firm’s earnings.
That effectively gives the firm a split personality.280 A portion of its
earnings is taxed under the conventional rules that apply to incorporated
firms, while the remainder is subject to tax under rules that resembled the
ones that apply to partnerships. However, the resemblance to partnership
taxation is imperfect. Among other things, the partners in a partnership
report both their share of the firm’s income and its losses.281 Under the
rules of subpart F, the ten percent shareholders cannot report their share
of the firm’s losses.282
When subpart F was originally proposed, some questioned the merits
of its particular approach for reaching the undistributed earnings of a
foreign corporation. Some expressed concerns that U.S. investors would
not be in a position to know whether they invested in a controlled foreign
corporation because their level of ownership would not give them access
to the records they would need to make that determination.283 Others
questioned whether the 10 percent threshold wrongly assumed that the
investor could exercise the kind of power to control the declaration of
dividends and other matters pertinent to the legislation.284
Despite these concerns, subpart F was enacted into law. Although its
basic structure has remained unchanged over the years, certain rules have
280. H. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 461 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405. See also S. REP. NO. 871881, at 785 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 707.
281. See I.R.C. § 702(a) (2019).
282. This was one of the criticisms voiced about the proposal. 1962 Hearings, supra note 279, at
3735 (New York State Bar Association Report on Foreign Income Provisions of Revenue Bill of 1962,
H.R. 10650).
283. Id. at 3784-85.
284. Id. at 3455 (statement submitted by statement submitted by N.R. Danielian of the International
Economic Policy Association). Another witness put it this way:
The result under the proposed new legislation is that the tax penalties upon the 10-percent
stockholder have become far more severe and his capacity to protect himself from these penalties
by complying with the law has been reduced—to the point that he will often and increasingly be
powerless to avert them and his only practical remedy will be to dispose of his holdings.
The stockholder of a ‘foreign personal holding company’ can always declare dividends to obtain
the necessary funds to pay any tax. By definition, a foreign personal holding company is over 50
percent owned by five or fewer U.S. citizens or residents each of whom, irrespective of his
percentage of ownership, is under the same compulsion to find the money to pay his tax-through
and who collectively, being over 50 percent, have the necessary control to force the declaration of
the required dividends.
Under H. R. 10650, a U.S. person holding 10 percent or more, but less than effective control, in
a foreign corporation is in a very different position. Personally, he has a strong motive either to
avert tax-through . . . However, his company will often be controlled by fellow stockholders who
have no such motive, and frequently have opposing ones.
Id. at 3930-31 (statement submitted by Thomas G. Corcoran). See also id. at 3047 (Statement of Adrian
A. Kragen).
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evolved in ways worth mentioning. Under the original statute, all shares
of stock were counted to determine whether a shareholder possessed the
ten percent minimum, while only voting stock was counted to determine
whether the ten percent shareholders collectively owned enough stock to
make the corporation a CFC.285 In 1986, Congress decided that a foreign
corporation would be a CFC if the firm’s 10 percent owners (by value)
collectively owned over 50 percent of the firm’s vote or value.286 By
2017, a shareholder would qualify as a 10 percent owner based on the
either vote or value.287
The 2017 Tax Act also added new rules that effectively cause a CFC’s
10 percent shareholders to include in their income a larger portion of the
CFC’s undistributed earnings.288 This change seems to reaffirm a
Congressional policy to suspend the ordinary rules for taxing corporate
profits when the firm’s ownership is sufficiently concentrated, justifying
the practice of taxing the owners on their share of the firm’s undistributed
earnings.
C. Common Controlled Corporations
In 1950, Congress introduced a surtax exemption on the first $25,000
of a corporation’s taxable income.289 In response, taxpayers began to
fragment their businesses into several corporations in order to claim
multiple exemptions.
There were several attempts to combat the abuse. First, Congress relied
on the Treasury Department to use special powers granted to it to address
the use of multiple corporations to avoid tax.290 Congress took a different
approach in 1962, imposing a 6 percent penalty on affiliated groups that
operated through multiple corporations.291 The statute targeted three
different types of corporate structures. One type was the brother-sister
controlled group, which was defined as two or more corporations each of
whose stock was owned eighty percent or more (by vote or value) by one
individual, estate, or trust.292 In 1969, Congress redefined a brother-sister
285. H. Rep. No. 88-2508, at 1168 (1962) (Conf. Rep.).
286. I.R.C. § 957 (2019).
287. I.R.C. § 958(b) (2019) (as amended by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §
14213, 131 Stat. 2054, 2217).
288. I.R.C. § 951A (2019).
289. See Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance on H.R. 13270, 91st
Cong. 1164 et seq. (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Hearings] (statement of James W. Riddell).
290. S. REP. NO. 82-781 at 68-69 (1951). Those powers are described in Code sections 269 and 482,
former sections 45 and 129. I.R.C. §§ 269 and 482 (2019) (formerly at I.R.C. §§ 45 and 129).
291. H. REP. NO. 88-749, at 118 (1964).
292. The second was the parent-subsidiary controlled group, which consisted of one or more chains
of corporations connected with a common parent corporation through 80 percent or more stock ownership,
determined by vote or value. The third was a combined group consisting of three or more corporations,
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controlled group to consist of two or more corporations which are owned
80 percent or more (by vote or value) by five or fewer persons.293 By
2004, Congress reduced the 80 percent threshold to 50 percent, bringing
the definition more closely in line with the approach found in the
ownership test for the personal holding company rules.294 The change
was made to eliminate the possibility that taxpayers could obtain the
benefit of the graduated rates through the use of multiple corporations that
are effectively commonly controlled even though the 80 percent test was
not satisfied.295 Under the current rules, a brother-sister controlled group
exists when 5 or fewer individuals, estates or trusts own over 50 percent
of the vote or value of the corporations.296
Now that all corporate income is taxed at a flat rate of twenty-one
percent, there may no longer be a need for the rules. However, when the
need did exist, Congress not only relied on the concentration of ownership
principle to address it, but did so by using a test inspired by the ownership
test in the personal holding company rules. In doing so, Congress yet
again signaled that such an ownership structure merits treating the firm as
a mere extension of its owners, not as a separate entity that is distinct from
its owners.297
D. The Passive Activity Rules
The passive activity rules explicitly borrow the personal holding
company ownership test to define the class of taxpayers subject to its antitax avoidance provisions. The passive activity rules are designed to
prevent individuals from inappropriately benefitting from the tax savings
generated through tax shelters, a term that describes investments in which
a significant portion of the taxpayer’s return is derived from tax savings,
not real economic earnings.298 The tax savings could take the form of
deductions that could offset income from another source. The savings

each of which is a member of a parent-subsidiary group or a brother-sister group, and one of which is a
common parent corporation.
293. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 401, 83 Stat. 487, 602. In addition, each
member of the ownership group had to individually own more than 50% of each corporation being tested.
294. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 900(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1650.
295. S. Rep. No. 108-192, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); Conf. Rep. No. 108-755, 108th Cong., 2d
Sess. (2004).
296. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1), (f)(5) (2019). Nonvoting nonparticipating preferred stock does not count
as stock for purposes of the test. I.R.C. § 1563(c) (2019).
297. The Kennedy Administration may have been a step ahead of Congress. In 1963, it proposed
defining a brother-sister group to exist where five or fewer individuals or corporations owned at least 80
percent of each corporation. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1964 before the Committee on Ways and
Means, Feb. 6, 1963 (testimony of Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon).
298. Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Tax Shelters and Minimum Tax (JCS39-85), Aug. 7, 1985, at 2.
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could also take the form of tax credits that could offset the tax an
individual would otherwise have to pay.
Congress believed that tax shelters eroded the perceived and real
fairness of the tax system. One legislative response, enacted in 1986, was
a set of rules that imposed limits on a taxpayer’s ability to claim loss
deductions and tax credits from passive activities.299 The rules apply
specifically to individuals, estates, and trusts and generally deny a
taxpayer the ability to utilize passive activity losses to offset income from
non-passive activities. 300 Thus, the rules directly address the tax shelters
whose primary appeal were tax losses that individuals could use to offset
income from other sources.
The rules also apply to a targeted group of corporations so that
individuals cannot use such entities to hide their personal investments in
tax shelters. Thus, a firm could be subject to the passive activity rules if
it constitutes a closely held corporation,301 a term that refers to any
corporation that meets the stock ownership test described in the personal
holding company rules.302 A closely held corporation cannot utilize
passive losses to offset portfolio income, such as interest and dividends.
Rather, it can only use such losses to offset active business income.303 As
incorporated into the passive activity rules, the personal holding company
ownership test serves the same purpose that it was intended to perform in
the 1934 act: to distinguish corporations that are the alter egos of their
owners from those that are separate and independent from them in a
meaningful way.
E. Limitation on Benefits under the Model U.S. Tax Treaty
When the U.S. negotiates a bilateral tax treaty (or proposes changes to
an existing one), it begins with a template known as the U.S. Model Tax
Treaty.304 The current version of that document contains a lengthy
provision designed to ensure that the benefits of the treaty are only
enjoyed by persons who are citizens or residents of the two treaty
signatory countries.305 The provision functions as an anti-abuse rule that
seeks to identify cases where someone who would ordinarily qualify as a
299. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a).
300. I.R.C. § 469(a).
301. I.R.C. § 469(a)(2)(B).
302. The statutes specifically cover any corporation that qualifies as a closely held corporation.
I.R.C. § 469(a)(2)(B). Such a corporation is any corporation that satisfies the personal holding company
ownership test. I.R.C. §§ 469(j)(1); 465(a)(1)(B).
303. I.R.C. § 469(e)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.469-1T(g)(4)(i).
304. CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS:
MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS ¶ 1245 (4th ed. 2011).
305. 2016 U.S. Model Tax Treaty, art. 22.
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citizen or resident of either treaty partner will not count as one. The rules
address both individuals and business entities. One of the rules that
applies to business entities contains clear echoes of the ownership test
from the personal holding company rules. Under the rule, if the taxpayer
is a corporation other than a publicly traded corporation, there are two
rules under which a corporation could remain eligible for treaty benefits.
The first rule applies to any privately held company. The second is
directed at subsidiaries of publicly traded companies. The latter rule
applies an ownership test that is satisfied if at least 50 percent of a
corporation’s voting power and value is owned directly or indirectly by
five or fewer publicly traded companies.306 Thus, the test focuses on
concentration of ownership by publicly traded companies.
To understand these rules, it is helpful to know the context in which
the provisions were drafted and the purposes that treaties serve. For many
years, U.S. tax policy was oriented toward achieving nondiscriminatory
tax treatment of U.S. and foreign based multinational corporations
abroad. Accordingly, there were very few provisions of U.S. domestic law
that provided tax relief to foreign persons.307 However, in the 1960s, the
country’s position began to change because it became more important to
attract foreign capital to finance domestic investment.308 That led
Congress to enact the Foreign Investors Tax Act, which exempted
foreigners from tax on portfolio gains.309
However, once the U.S. became one of the world’s largest debtor
nations with a huge trade deficit and large inflows of capital, Congress
became more concerned with limiting the revenue loss that occurred when
foreigners either (1) took advantage of rules granting tax relief, or (2)
exploited the benefits available under the network of tax treaties.310 The
limitation on benefits rules takes on that job in part by classifying
corporations that are extensions of their owners from those that are
separate and distinct from their owners. Moreover, a variation of the five
or fewer formulation appears yet again to function as the measuring rod.
The only difference is that it would be good for the firm to be viewed as
an extension of the owner because that would allow the taxpayer to enjoy
the benefits available under the treaty. In the anti-abuse rules discussed
306. 2016 U.S. Model Tax Treaty, art. 22(2)(d)(i).
307. Simone M. Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty Shopping Provisions: A
Comparative Analysis, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 238 (1996) (citing Robert A. Ragland, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR A GLOBAL ECONOMY E-2 (1991)).
308. Id. Tax policy was also reoriented to attract foreign capital. This was accomplished by adopting
rules that produce uniform treatment of domestic and foreign operations of U.S. persons, a policy referred
to as capital export neutrality. This is partly reflected by the adoption of the controlled foreign corporation
provisions in 1962.
309. Foreign Investors Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966).
310. Haug, supra note 307, at 239 (citing Peter R. Merill & Robert J. Patrick, U.S. International
Tax Policy for a Global Economy, TAX NOTES INT’L, Jan. 20, 1992, at 137).
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above, the taxpayer would not be entitled to tax savings when the firm
satisfied the concentration of ownership test.
F. S Corporations
The anti-tax avoidance rules discussed above address situations where
a corporation can be used to conceal the identity of a taxpayer who may
try take advantage of certain tax benefits that might not otherwise be
available. However, Congress has not always been uniformly focused on
preserving the integrity of the two-track system for taxing business
profits. Perhaps the most prominent instance occurred in the 1950s, when
Congress deliberately offered taxpayers the option to elect the method for
taxing the profits of a business without regard to the firm’s state law
business form.
Under one entity classification election adopted in 1954 referred to as
subchapter R, sole proprietorships and partnerships could elect to be taxed
as if they were corporations.311 Under another provision adopted in 1958,
corporations could elect to be treated as if they were partnerships.312
Subchapter R was repealed in 1957,313 while the election for corporations
remains in existence today and can be found in subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code.314 That election has always been restricted to
certain eligible corporations. One eligibility requirement is that the firm’s
shareholders not exceed a certain number. Initially, the limit was ten;
today the limit is 100.315 The rules of subchapter S will only apply if the
shareholders unanimously consent.316 When the subchapter S rules apply,
the profits of the corporation are essentially taxed as if they were derived
by a partnership. Thus, the firm itself pays no tax on its earnings; instead,
the owners pay tax on their share of the earnings each year, regardless of
whether they actually received a distribution from the firm.317 Conversely,

311. I.R.C. § 1361 (1954).
312. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606, 1650.
313. The Treasury Department was expected to issue regulations addressing the details of the new
election. However, after four years, no regulations had been issued. In the interim, taxpayers were
reluctant to take advantage of the option in the absence of clarifying guidance from the government.
Congress repealed the provision because it had not been effectively used. Mirit Eyal-Cohen, When
American Small Business Hit the Jackpot: Taxes, Politics and the History of Organizational Choice in
the 1950’s, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 36-37 (2008).
314. I.R.C. § 1361-1378.
315. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 64, 72 Stat. 1606, 1650
(establishing the ten shareholder limit); American Jobs Creation Act of 1004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, §
232(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1434 (raising the limit to 100). See also I.R.C § 1361(b) for the entire list of
conditions that must be met to qualify for the election.
316. I.R.C. § 1362(a)(2).
317. I.R.C. § 1366(a).
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the owners enjoy tax savings in any year the firm generates a loss.318
Congress enacted subchapters R and S during a time when it began to
use the tax system as a tool to achieve certain social and economic
goals.319 In this instance, there was substantial evidence that the existing
tax rules were promoting oligopolies and monopolies at the expense of
small businesses.320 Congress adopted subchapter R to eliminate this
discriminatory effect of the federal tax law.321 Similarly, subchapter S
was intended to provide tax relief to small businesses so they could more
effectively compete in the economy.322
Thus, the elections that Congress made available to taxpayers in
subchapters R and S are distinct measures designed to achieve specific
non-tax policies. They do not represent part of a congressional effort to
rationalize the taxation of business profits or to preserve the integrity of
the corporate tax.323 It is significant that the election is just that—an
option—for the firm to be treated in one way or another. It is also
revealing that even after the elections were incorporated into the Internal
Revenue Code, Congress adopted additional anti-abuse rules that
employed the concentration of ownership principle. That would include
all the rules discussed above starting with the rules for controlled foreign
corporations.
VII. THEORIES OF FIRM BEHAVIOR
The noncontroversial and durable quality of the personal holding
company ownership test and its variations may reflect a longstanding
consensus about the distinct dynamics of the modern commercial
enterprise. Those dynamics were thoroughly explored in academic
writings published both before and after passage of the personal holding
company rules. This section summarizes that body of scholarly literature.
A. Berle and Means
Perhaps the most thorough and influential study of corporations was
published in 1932, just two years before Congress passed the personal
holding company rules. Entitled THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY, this study was the product of two Ivy League
318. Id.
319. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 313, at 20.
320. Id. at 15.
321. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 118 (1954).
322. S. REP. NO. 85-1237, at 3 (1958).
323. That statement applies with particular force to the rules under subchapter S. See, Roberta
Mann, Subchapter S: Vive Le Difference!, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 65 (2014).
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professors: Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardner C. Means.324 Time magazine
described the book as “the economic Bible of the Roosevelt
Administration.”325 It would also become the most quoted text in
corporate governance studies. Their study showed that the means of
production in the U.S. economy was severely concentrated in the hands
of the country’s 200 largest corporations. It also described how the vast
majority of stockholders had effectively lost control of their property,
which had become subject to the sole control of professional managers
whose interests could not be expected to overlap with those of the
company’s investors.326 In short, ownership had become separated from
control. The authors went so far as to conclude that the owners of
corporate stock had become subservient to management.327
Berle and Means were careful to note that their observations and
conclusions did not apply to all corporations. Rather, they only applied to
the firms they described as quasi-public corporations. The dynamics of
such firms are materially different from the ones that characterize a
closely held one. In fact, the mere act of incorporating a closely held firm
would not constitute a material change for all practical purposes,
according to Berle and Means. In their words, “[i]t has long been possible
for an individual to incorporate his business even though it still represents
his own investment, his own activities, and his own business transactions;
he has in fact merely created a legal alter ego by setting up a corporation
as the nominal vehicle.”328 In that instance, ownership and control
overlap.
By contrast, the separation of ownership and control that distinguishes
the quasi-public corporation produces a condition where “the interests of
owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where
many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power
disappear.”329 Thus, Berle and Means appreciated the fact that their
observations about the special dynamics that operate in the modern
industrial enterprise do not apply uniformly to all corporations. Rather,
it depends on the extent to which the parties who own the firm also control
it.
Berle and Means believed that corporations could be roughly classified
along a continuum based on the degree and control exercised by their
shareholders. They conceptualized control as existing in five different
forms:
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

BERLE & MEANS, supra note 83.
Transportation: Credit Manager, TIME, Apr. 24, 1933, at 14.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 83, at 6-7.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.
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Control through almost complete ownership,
Majority control,
Control through a legal device without majority ownership,
Minority control,
Management control.330

The first form of control exists in what Berle and Means refer to as the
private corporation, i.e. one that consists of a single individual or a small
group of associates owning all or practically all of the outstanding stock
of the firm.331 Majority control referred to cases where the ownership of
a majority of the stock by a single individual or small group provided that
group with virtually all the legal powers of control, particularly the power
to select the company’s board of directors.332 Legal devices of control
typically consolidate or concentrate voting power in a single individual or
small group. That would be the case when a corporation issues nonvoting
stock, effectively leaving all control in the hands of the investors who own
the voting stock.333 Minority control generally exists when a small group
holds a sufficient interest to be in a position to dominate a corporation
through the voting power represented by their shares of stock.334 Finally,
management control prevails when the stock is so widely held that no
individual or small group even has a minority interest large enough to
dominate.335
It is noteworthy how closely the different categories of control
envisioned by Berle and Means seem to be reflected in the personal
holding company ownership test and its variations. At their core, those
tests focus on concentration of ownership or control. Concentrated
ownership is precisely the basis for the first two categories of control
articulated by Berle and Means. Their formulations refer to the presence
of a small group that owns a certain threshold of shares and the power
associated with the block of shares. The personal holding company rules
operate on the same premise and translate the idea into the five or fewer
test. Concentrated control is also a concept built into the ownership test
contained in the foreign personal holding company rules and the
controlled foreign corporation provisions
The Berle and Means book may have been a widely read publication,
330. Id. at 70.
331. Id.; Id. at 93. For purposes of their analysis, Berle and Means classified a corporation as private
if at least 80 percent of the stock was held by a compact group of individuals.
332. Id. at 71; Id. at 93. For purposes of their analysis, a firm was majority owned if the public
owned less than 50 percent of the stock, but at least 20 percent.
333. Id. at 72-80. A similar result would occur when shareholders transfer their shares to a voting
trust, leaving the trustee the sole individual authorized to vote the shares. Id.
334. Id. at 80 (Berle and Means considered this to be the case when the relevant group owns at least
20 percent but less than 50 percent of the stock).
335. Id. at 84.
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but it was not the first to offer some of the observations that it described.
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation had
been understood by scholars for years.336 It was even expressly
acknowledged that management could not be relied on to pursue the
interests of absentee owners.337 Indeed, the separation of ownership and
control was essential to the very structure of the corporate form. That is
what made it uniquely suited to accommodate large scale commercial
enterprises, fueling the growth of industrial firms requiring enormous
commitments of capital.338
The earlier studies did not explicitly acknowledge how observations
about the separation of ownership and control did not apply to closely
held firms. Yet this distinction was implicit in those studies because they
limited their examination to the large-scale industrial enterprise. Thus,
Berle and Means were explicit about drawing a distinction that was
widely understood to exist, including by the members of Congress
responsible for drafting anti-tax avoidance legislation. At the very least,
those tax law writers intuitively appreciated that closely held corporations
behaved more like traditional partnerships and unlike the publicly traded
firms that began to dominate the economic landscape. That became
evident during the deliberations on various aspects of the bills under
consideration during the formative years of the modern income tax. It is
also evident from the content of some the laws enacted during the period.
It may not be possible to directly connect the personal holding
company ownership test to insights offered by Berle and Means or anyone
else. Still, it seems more than coincidental that the ownership test tracks
so closely some key concepts that had been developed by the
contemporary scholars in the field. At the very least, these insights might
help explain why the ownership test proved to be so noncontroversial,
durable, and effective.

336. E.g., ROBERT BROOKINGS, INDUSTRIAL OWNERSHIP: ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
SIGNIFICANCE 1-24 (1925) (describing the separation of ownership from management and illustrating how
the large scale industrial firms that came to dominate the economy had owners who ceased to exercise
their right to select the managers, allowing the managers to effectively select themselves); THORSTEIN
VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES 82-100 (1923) (describing
the separation of ownership and emphasizing how owners in the modern industrialized firm have been
reduced to mere suppliers of capital whose principal concern is a return on their investment, while
management furnishes specialized skills in the service of a complex commercial institution); THOMAS
NIXON CARVER, THE PRESENT ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 90-122 (1925)
(describing how laborers were accounting for a growing share of industrial securities, helping to displace
the dominant position of the rich and making the ownership of such firms more and more diffuse); I.
MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED 87-160 (1931) (describing how managers of
industrial firms frequently own no shares in the companies they manage, while the owners of its shares
might not have any voting power).
337. BROOKINGS, supra, note 336, at 23.
338. Id.
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B. Modern Economic Theories of the Firm
Modern economic theories of the firm continue to recognize the
fundamental insight that a firm’s concentration of ownership will
determine the way it behaves. Economic theories of the firm try to
explain the boundaries of the firm. More specifically, they try to explain
why some transactions occur within firms and others occur in the
marketplace. In 1937, Ronald Coase was the first to offer a theory.339
Since then, economists have worked to refine his theories.340 The most
recent strand of literature is called the property rights theory of the firm.341
According to that theory, firms arise when parties are engaged in long
term relationships and make relationship-specific investments.342 The
terms of the relationship are generally spelled out in a contract. However,
that document does not anticipate every possible issue that may arise over
the course of the relationship. One mechanism for addressing an
incomplete contract is for one party to simply acquire ownership of the
other party. This way, the acquiring party can dictate a resolution of
matters that the parties did not anticipate.
The property rights theory posits that the owner of an asset (such as a
firm) has the power to fill any gaps in an incomplete contract because
ownership of the asset comes with residual rights of control over it. Thus,
the owner can dictate all uses of an asset not specified in a contract. More
importantly, ownership affects substantive economic outcomes because
the owner of an asset is the party with the strongest incentives to invest in
it. If ownership of the asset changes, the incentive shifts from one party
to another.
According to property rights theory, the economic boundaries of a firm
will include all assets that are under common or unified control;
formalistic or legalistic boundaries are irrelevant. Thus, if one
corporation is wholly owned by another, the property rights theory would
not view the two legal entities as two separate economic entities. Instead,
the two would constitute one single firm. Berle and Means would have
339. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)
340. E.g., Oliver E. Williamson, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985);
Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. AND ECON. 297 (1978);
341. This theory is developed and discussed in detail in Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, The
Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119
(1990); OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); and Oliver Hart, An
Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989).
342. The basic elements of the property rights theory of the firm were cogently synthesized by T.
Christopher Borek, et al., Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of the Firm Perspective on
the Economic Substance Doctrine, 57 J. L. & ECON. 975, 978-981 (2014).
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drawn the same conclusion. In other words, ownership of a firm
continues to play a central role in economic theories that explain the
boundaries of the firm. That crucial insight explains why the
concentration of ownership principle offers a fundamentally sound basis
for determining whether a firm should be treated by the tax system as an
extension of its owners or as a freestanding taxpaying unit that is separate
and distinct from them.
C. Agency Theory
The insights of agency theory may also help explain the durability and
power of concentration of ownership as an organizing principle for
distinguishing firms for tax purposes.343 An agency relationship arises
whenever one or more parties (the principal(s)) engage another party (the
agent) to perform on their behalf some service that requires the agent to
exercise delegated decision-making authority.344 Agency theory is based
on the fundamental observation that the agent will not always act in the
best interests of the principal because the two parties may have divergent
interests in certain situations.345 Within a corporation, the relationship
between the shareholders and management is one example of an agency
relationship, with the shareholders acting as the principal and
management serving as their agents. As general agency theory makes
clear, one should not expect the agent (management) to always act in ways
that serve the best interests of the principals (shareholders), particularly
when those interests conflict.
Several scholars have already described how common issues arising in
a corporation’s business affairs can reveal the conflicting interests of
shareholders and managers.346 Generally, shareholders must monitor
management to guard against decisions that will result in higher
management compensation and prestige without a corresponding benefit
to shareholders. This tension became apparent during the formative years
of the income tax. Management at publicly owned firms fought the
adoption of a tax on undistributed corporate profits, viewing it as a threat
to their unrestricted power to set dividend policy.347 In order to repel
343. For a general discussion of agency theory and the agency cost problem in the economics and
finance literature, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Frank H. Easterbrook, Two
Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650 (1984); and Eugene Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
344. Jensen & Meckling, supra, note 343, at 308.
345. Id.
346. See e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 83.
347. Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 167, 171 note 18 (2002) (citing Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and
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Congressional efforts to impose such a tax, they aligned themselves with
the forces fighting for a shareholder tax on dividends, even though that
would burden the firm’s shareholders with a double tax on the dividends
they received.348
Agency theory also explains the various ways that firms responded
when Congress cut the tax on corporate dividends in 2003. Prior to the
legislation, corporate dividends were taxed at the same rate as other types
of income. Afterwards, most dividends were taxed at a substantially
lower rate, creating a potential incentive for corporations to distribute
their earnings. Indeed, dividends rose sharply and quickly after the law
took effect. However, the response was more dramatic and pronounced
in firms whose executives owned a larger fraction of outstanding shares
and in firms with large shareholders who occupied seats on the board of
directors.349 Ordinarily, managers would prefer to retain earnings to fund
pet projects. However, for managers who also owned large blocks of
stock, a cut in the dividend tax changed the calculus. For those managers,
the tax cut suddenly made it more attractive for them to have a dividend
in their pocket than to have the power to spend the firm’s earnings.350
Along the same lines, the large shareholders who occupied board seats
simply used their power and influence to pressure the board to declare
dividends.351 If ownership was too dispersed to allow any individual
shareholders to occupy a seat on the board, a cut in the dividend tax would
not have affected the decision about whether it was in the company’s best
interest to declare a dividend.
Agency theory would seem to offer a similar explanation for the
enduring power of the ownership test in the personal holding company
rules. The test only captures firms whose shares are owned in blocks large
enough to represent an influential voice in the firm’s affairs, even if the
holder does not actually sit on the board or occupy a position in
management. In some cases, there may be one individual who owns a
block large enough to dictate company policy. In others, there will be
more than one person with such power. However, the number will be a
finite one that is small enough for any problems normally associated with
collective action to be minimized.352 Therefore, even when there is no
Managerial Renumeration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACC. & ECON. 11, 11-12 (1985); James R. Repetti,
The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 698699 (1997)).
348. Id. at 217-223.
349. Raz Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, An Agency Theory of Dividend Taxation, 1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13538, 2007).
350. Id. at 3.
351. Id.
352. Those difficulties include rational apathy and the temptation of individual shareholders to take
a free ride. Robert Charles Clark, CORPORATE LAW 389-94 (Francis A. Allen et al. Eds., 1986).
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single person who can dictate policy, management is unlikely to pursue
its interests at the expense of the controlling group of shareholders.
VIII. A PROPOSAL FOR CLASSIFYING FIRMS FOR TAX PURPOSES
A. The Basic Elements
This Article has argued that the tax system should use concentration of
ownership as the basis for classifying business firms for all purposes. It
has also suggested that the test for classifying business firms could be
modeled after the personal holding company ownership test, a test that
asks whether five or fewer individuals own over half the value of a
corporation for the last six months of the year.353 If such a test were to be
applied to classify firms for all income tax purposes, it would require that
five or fewer taxpayers (individuals or firms classified as separate entities
under test) own over half the value of any firm during some relevant
window of time.354 Whenever the test is met, the firm would not
constitute a taxable entity. That would cause the profits of the firm to be
taxed under the default rules that now apply to a partnership if there are
multiple owners. The firm would be entirely disregarded if there is only
one owner, leaving the activities of the firm attributed to the owner as if
it were a sole proprietorship. In cases where the firm did not possess the
necessary concentration of ownership, it would be treated as a corporation
for tax purposes, causing the firm’s profits to be taxed at both the entity
and shareholder levels.
In order to function properly, the concentration of ownership test
should be supplemented with attribution rules similar to the ones currently
used within the personal holding company context.355 Those rules
accomplish two things. First, some of the rules cause individuals (and
entities) to be treated as the constructive owners of stock that is actually
owned by certain related persons. So, for example, if two spouses each
own stock in Company A, one spouse would be considered the

353. I.R.C. § 542(a)(2).
354. There is reason to believe that the five or fewer formulation fairly estimates the concentration
necessary to cause a firm to behave like an extension of its owners. A 2006 government analysis of S
corporations examined the incidence of firms whose officers received no compensation for the services
they performed, suggesting that the firm substituted dividends for such compensation. Such a strategy
gives the officers access to the firm’s earnings without triggering any employment tax liability. The study
found that of the firms engaging in this technique, 87 percent had no more than 2 shareholders and 93
percent had no more than 3. Firms with up to 10 shareholders accounted for 99 percent of the total cases.
NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS – VOLUME 1, 314 (2008). In a
transaction involving two unrelated persons, the officer would have insisted on receiving compensation
for the work, and the firm would have paid a market rate.
355. See I.R.C. § 318 (2005).
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constructive owner of any stock actually owned by the other, and vice
versa.356
This rule prevents an individual from bypassing the
concentration of ownership test by transferring stock to a related person
to disguise the true ownership. Second, the attribution rules can also treat
stock owned by certain entities as being constructively owned by the
entity’s owners. Under one such rule, any stock owned by a partnership
is treated as proportionally owned by its partners.357 Thus, if a partnership
owned 100 shares of stock in Company A, a partner who owned a 60
percent interest in the partnership would constructively own 60 shares of
Company A stock.
A few hypotheticals will illustrate how this combination of rules would
apply to determine the tax classification of business firms. Consider the
case of a firm consisting of a group of ten investors. If each investor
owned an equal share of the firm, each would own a ten percent interest
in the firm. Under the five or fewer test, the firm would be classified as a
corporation because five of the investors would not own over half the
value of the firm—they would own exactly half. It is conceivable that one
of the investors could transfer a fractional interest to another investor so
that the firm could be classified as a partnership. This type of tax planning
is theoretically possible. However, because control is the defining
characteristic of ownership, there are very significant practical reasons
why it would not occur.358 Parties will be extremely reluctant to shift
ownership solely to achieve a particular tax outcome unless they are also
willing to accept the change in power dynamics that comes with the new
allocation of ownership interests.359
In the hypothetical involving the ten investors, under an even allocation
of ownership interests, it would take six investors working in concert to
authorize any action by the firm. If ownership interests are not evenly
allocated, it would take fewer investors to do so. The smaller the control
group, the more likely the firm will be used to serve the interests of the
individuals comprising that group. As the size of the control group grows,
it becomes more difficult for the firm to be used to accomplish the
interests of any particular investor or group of investors. Among other
things, each additional member of the control group adds to the diversity
of interests, making it difficult for them to use the firm to optimize the tax
consequences for all of them.360 Thus, any adjustment in ownership will
affect the allocation of control.
One might imagine that tax planners would try to manipulate the
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (2005).
I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A) (2005).
Borek, supra note 342, at 996.
Id. at 999.
Hamill, supra note 24, at 426 (1996).
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classification of a firm by using a tiered ownership structure. Consider the
case of an operating company with widely dispersed ownership, including
some owners who are classified as corporations. The concentration of
ownership test would treat the company as a corporation for tax purposes.
A tiered ownership structure would not change that result. In a tiered
structure, the operating company could be owned by five first-tier firms.
Each first-tier firm would be owned by five second-tier firms. Each
second-tier firm would be owned by five third-tier firms, and so on. The
attribution rules would disregard the intermediate firms, causing the
individuals and corporations owning interests in the top-tier firms to be
treated as the owners of the operating company.361 In the final analysis,
the company would be treated as having the same number of owners as it
did without the intermediate tiers of firms. Thus, it would not be possible
for a company with diluted ownership to successfully use a tiered
structure to transform itself from a corporation to a nontaxable entity.
One could also imagine that tax planners might consider ways to
structure an investment so that the income of a U.S. corporation could be
shifted to a low- or no-tax foreign jurisdiction. However, existing
international provisions of the Internal Revenue Code would seem to
prevent such a strategy from achieving that objective. Consider a U.S.
corporation that is directly owned by members of the public. Under
current rules, the firm is a corporation because it is incorporated under
state law. For that reason, the firm is subject to U.S. tax on any income it
derives, while its shareholders are subject to U.S. tax on amounts they
receive from the firm as a dividend. A tiered structure utilizing a foreign
entity would produce the same result. The basic strategy might be to
interpose a foreign corporation in between the shareholders and the
existing operating company, resulting in the U.S. operating company
becoming the wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign company that is
publicly traded. Because it would have one owner, the operating
company would be disregarded under the concentration of ownership
principle, while that upper tier foreign company would be a corporation
under the same principle. Considering solely the proposed rule for
classifying business entities, that would appear to make the foreign parent
solely liable for tax on the earnings derived by the U.S. operating
company. If the foreign parent is domiciled in a jurisdiction that imposes
no tax on corporate earnings (e.g., the Cayman Islands), then the income
would effectively be insulated from any tax (U.S. or foreign) until the
foreign parent pays a dividend to the shareholders.
However, under current tax rules, any foreign corporation is subject to
U.S. tax on its taxable income that is effectively connected with a trade
361. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A) (2005).
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or business in the United States.362 In the case of a wholly owned
subsidiary, the subsidiary’s separate existence would be disregarded,
causing its activities to be attributed to the parent.363 Thus, if the U.S.
operating company derives all of its income from conducting business in
the U.S., the tax bill of the foreign parent would be identical to the tax bill
of the U.S. operating company in the absence of a tiered structure.
B. Possible Concerns and Considerations
Berle and Means suggested that concentration of ownership would not
be the only factor affecting the dynamics of a corporation. Devices that
realign power within a firm might produce the same result. For example,
in the case of a corporation, the firm could issue both voting stock and
nonvoting stock. If the voting stock were held by a sufficiently small
number of shareholders, that group would be in a position to dictate the
firm’s policies, no matter how dispersed the nonvoting shares are actually
held. Different classes of stock could be used to produce the same result
if one class of stock gave shareholders the right to fill a controlling
number of board seats, leaving the other class with token membership on
the board.
These possibilities might lead one to consider adjusting the proposed
entity classification rule so that it accounts for concentration of voting
power, not just concentration of ownership. Indeed, concentration of
voting power appears often in the rules surveyed in Part VI, but it plays a
very inconsistent role. It is not a factor in the personal holding company
rules. Nor was it a factor in the foreign personal company rules when they
were first adopted in 1937. Fifty years later, a firm met the ownership test
if a concentration of either voting power or value was present.
Concentration of voting power was the only factor used in the controlled
foreign corporation provisions when they were first adopted in 1962.
Today, the ownership test would be met if a concentration of either voting
power or value was present. The common controlled corporation rules
also consider the concentration of either voting power or value. The
passive activity rules refer to the ownership test in the personal holding
company rules, where concentration of voting power is irrelevant. Under
the limitation on benefits provision, a firm must have both a concentration
of voting power and value.
These anti-abuse rules must be considered in light of the purpose they
are designed to serve. Each one is targeted at a specific abuse of the
corporate form to disguise one’s identity in order to avoid tax. Using
362. I.R.C. § 882(a) (2017).
363. A parallel rule applies when there are multiple owners operating in partnership. See I.R.C. §
875(1) (1966).
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voting power as an alternative way to classify all firms (not just
incorporated firms) for all purposes could be problematic because it might
open the door to a specific tax planning opportunity. Firms whose
interests are sufficiently dispersed to qualify as a corporation could
deliberately concentrate power solely to qualify as a partnership. On the
other hand, basing a firm’s classification solely on the concentration of
ownership presents the risk that a firm whose ownership is dispersed
would be treated as a corporation even though power might be sufficiently
concentrated to make the firm an extension of the individuals belonging
to the control group. It is difficult to determine the magnitude of these two
risks; in fact, they may cancel each other out. However, given the
objective to design a mandatory rule that is not subject to manipulation,
the most sensible approach may be for the entity classification rules to
focus solely on concentration of ownership.
Indeed, the overall objective of this Article is to determine when firms
can be expected to function as extensions of their owners. This will be
the case only when the owners also manage the firm; the interests of the
owners will diverge from those of its managers when there is an actual
separation of ownership and control. Therefore, the more sensible choice
would be to distinguish firms solely by considering concentration of
ownership.
C. The Benefits of a Mandatory Entity Classification Rule
If concentration of ownership became the basis for classifying business
firms, there would little justification for the Internal Revenue Code to
contain more than one version of the partnership model for taxing
business profits. Thus, the S corporation rules could become obsolete.364
It may also be necessary to reconsider the rationale for many anti-abuse
rules that now litter the Internal Revenue Code. The most obvious
candidates for reexamination would be the personal holding company
rules and the other provisions discussed in Part VI, all of which now use
some version of the concentration of ownership test. In addition, the
classification rules could potentially serve as a substitute for defining a
consolidated group of corporations.
The most significant benefit, however, may be that this alternative
system for classifying business firms would foreclose a variety of tax

364. The idea of unifying the partnership and S corporation rules has been proposed elsewhere. See
Willard Taylor, Does One Size Fit All? Should There Be a Single Set of Federal Income Tax Rules for S
Corporations and Partnerships? 8 OHIO STATE ENTREPREN. BUS. L. J. 327 (2013) (evaluating a proposal
considered in WAYS & MEANS COMM., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE WAYS AND MEANS
COMMITTEE DISCUSSION DRAFT PROVISIONS TO REFORM THE TAXATION OF SMALL BUSINESSES AND
PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES (2013)).
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avoidance techniques that now depend on a firm’s tax classification.
Consider, for example, a very common tax avoidance technique that is
currently available when a closely held firm is classified as a corporation.
If the owners also work for the firm and want to access the firm’s profits,
they typically have two options for doing so. They could either receive a
dividend on their stock or compensation for their work. If the payout is
structured as compensation, the shareholder-employee would have to pay
both income and employment tax, while the firm could deduct the
payment itself and any payroll taxes that would apply. By contrast, if the
payment took the form of a dividend, the payment would not lead to a
reduction in the firm’s tax liability, while causing the recipient to incur
income (but not employment) tax on the amount received. Individual
circumstances would dictate which choice would trigger the lowest
combined tax, but the larger point is that the option itself is available
solely because the employee-owners control the firm and chose to classify
it as a corporation.
This particular tax planning option would not exist under the proposed
mandatory classification system. If the firm’s ownership is sufficiently
concentrated, the firm would be classified as a partnership, and, under
current rules, the owner would be taxed on his entire share of the earnings,
no matter what. By contrast, if the firm’s ownership is sufficiently
dispersed, the firm will be acting in its own self-interest, not in the service
of any individual owner or group of owners. As a result, market factors,
not tax considerations, will drive decisions about the amount and structure
of any payout to an owner.
IX. CONCLUSION
The tax system would not need a way to classify business firms if it
contained only one method for taxing business profits. However, because
the U.S. has two distinctively different ways to tax business profits, it is
imperative to have a rational way to determine when one method prevails
over the other. Throughout the existence of the modern income tax, the
method for taxing a firm’s profits has always depended on a firm’s tax
classification. However, there has never been a satisfactory way to
establish that classification because there has never been a satisfactory
way to distinguish firms. The formalistic and legalistic factors that used
to matter were inadequate because taxpayers could simply manipulate the
factors to achieve their tax objectives without compromising economic
outcomes. That experience revealed the need to develop a more
substantive basis for distinguishing firms for tax purposes. In short, we
need a tax theory of the firm.
This Article offers a tax theory of the firm whose organizing principle
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is concentration of ownership. That principle explains the very reason
why the U.S. initially adopted the corporate tax as an alternative to the
traditional way of taxing firms as if they were extension of their owners.
The principle is supported by longstanding economic theories that explain
the behavior of firms. The principle lies at the heart of a wide range of
anti-abuse rules that effectively treat a firm as a partnership when it is
classified as a corporation. And each of those rules adopts a similar
formula to translate the concentration of ownership principle into an
objective test to determine whether a firm should be respected as such or
not: whether five or fewer individuals own over half the value of the firm.
The concentration of ownership principle, as expressed by this formula,
represents a viable and defensible way to distinguish firms for tax
purposes. It deserves to serve as the organizing principle for a
comprehensive tax theory of the firm that can dictate the way a firm is
classified for tax purposes. Until the government adopts such a unifying
theory of the firm, the tax system will fail to tax business profits in an
equitable way.
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